700+ entries in 0.362s
mircea_popescu: should i need
entropy i'd rather wotbuy it than os-"make" it
mod6: put up 1.5Gb of
entropy... start the bidding at say 1mn ecu
mircea_popescu: might be a market in "Certified
entropy" simply because of how bureaucracy works.
mircea_popescu: if they're happy with hash(x) can get
entropy right now by curl google.com > sha512sum.
mod6:
http://btcbase.org/log/2017-05-25#1661674 << was thinking there, for those who would want it, a model where guy asks for N bytes of
entropy via FG. would generate N bytes. base64 encode the binary
entropy file (similar to trb deps), place the sha512 output hash of the base64 decoded file along with the ent & dieharder output in a clearsigned message, then PGP encrypt it to the requester.
☝︎ a111: Logged on 2017-05-25 03:08 mod6: !~later tell gabriel_laddel_p Let me know how much
entropy you'd like, I'll run ent test & dieharder against it, let you decide if you want it. I'll ask 0.1 BTC per Gb. What is your bid?
a111: Logged on 2017-05-25 03:08 mod6: !~later tell gabriel_laddel_p Let me know how much
entropy you'd like, I'll run ent test & dieharder against it, let you decide if you want it. I'll ask 0.1 BTC per Gb. What is your bid?
mod6: !~later tell gabriel_laddel_p Let me know how much
entropy you'd like, I'll run ent test & dieharder against it, let you decide if you want it. I'll ask 0.1 BTC per Gb. What is your bid?
☟︎☟︎ mircea_popescu: it's so easy to make perfectly balanced faux
entropy, only some very inept usg-ians would use anything else.
Framedragger: asciilifeform: checked, yeah pretty amazing, damn; obviously lots of memory overhead depending on noise/
entropy, but point is that it was actually something new, as you say, not just any optimisation
a111: Logged on 2017-05-08 14:14 Framedragger: asciilifeform: are you planning on building an
entropy source based on them, then? :) need a good uv light reader, or something?
Framedragger: asciilifeform: are you planning on building an
entropy source based on them, then? :) need a good uv light reader, or something?
☟︎ mod6: at the end of the page it says "distill a days worth of
entropy and xor in place"
shinohai goes back to filling his box with malicious
entropy ....
mircea_popescu: but yes, i agree there's a huge difference between "spit out string hunter2 half tyhe time" and
entropy eh
mircea_popescu: and check out the "min-
entropy" "best strategy" thing on slide 10.
mircea_popescu: basically this tribe thinks that what shannon
entropy is, is when P takes value "hunter2" in 50% of the cases and a random in the remainder of cases and therefore this is "no good for crypto because i can guess what your password will be".
phf: afaiu shannon's
entropy being a probability is descriptive, rather than prescriptive. so it can categorize a sequence of events, but it can't really say anything about how those sequence of events come about. so i'm not entirely sure how it even applies to engineering problem of event generation..
mircea_popescu: <eightyeight> he clearly doesn't understand the differences between shannon
entropy and
entropy as defined by the 2nd law of thermodynamics
mircea_popescu: well, the guy is evidently not in the mood to indulge, but let's try this. "<eightyeight> his "Is there such a thing as better or worse
entropy ?" paragraph is equally as painful to read
Framedragger: nice one mod6,
entropy still at steady 8.0 bits per byte i see :D
a111: Logged on 2016-08-18 12:32 mircea_popescu: asciilifeform since we're on this btw, the way i want tmsr-rsa key generation to work is as follows : a contains a number of
entropy bytes specified by user in tmsr-rsa.conf read whenever tmsr-rsa.conf specifies (such as urandom); b contains a base-tmsr string specified by user. c = base-tmsr(a).b ; p = nextprime(cut(sha512(c),257)) ; process is repeated for q = nextprime (cut(sha512(c'),258));
mod6: I'm also running ent/dh against 1.2Gb of collected fg
entropy, but this time I did it with: `dd iflag=fullblock if=/dev/ttyUSB0 of=fg1.fg4.bin`
mod6: third collection of ~1Gb of
entropy is complete from my first fg. running ent & dh now...
mod6: also, collected another 1.1Gb of
entropy from fg since yesterday.
mod6: not sure if I mentioned yesterday, but I did start a collection of another ~1Gb of
entropy from the same fg as I wrote up the blog post about.
Framedragger tried fg last weekend, was all good, (very) small sample (2.7MB) had 7.999936 bits of
entropy per byte. but yet to test more thoroughly, including removing shields, etc.
mircea_popescu: obvious example : does monotonous temperature variation result in more 1's ? something along the lines of "batch 1 we kept at 20, batch 2 we took from 0 to 40 over one hour, batch 3 we took from 40 to 0 over one hour. out of the 10gb worth of
entropy recorded in that hour, batch 1 is 50-50 split, batch 2 is 75% 0s, batch 3 is 74% 1s.
mircea_popescu: did you do a mapping of temperature ->
entropy or anything like that ?
BenBE: What's the
entropy source used in those Cardano RNG?
Framedragger: bots autoup folks there, use channel as funnel of good material into #trilema; or, bots calculate
entropy of nicks outputting there, creating automatic pipeline.. horrible idea i know
Framedragger: heh, this is close to
entropy (and inequality as 1/
entropy)
veen: how is /dev/fg not centralized
entropy pool?
veen: seems gpg tried to sovereignty-wash a source of
entropy and here it is bearing your criticism anyway
thestringpuller: "RAND_poll seeds the random number generator using a system-specific
entropy source, which is /dev/urandom on UNIX-like operating systems" << so openssl default is PRNG??? RE: "The urandom device may lack sufficient
entropy for your needs, and you might want to reseed it immediately from /dev/random. On Unix and other operating systems that provide the block device, you can use RAND_load_file to load directly from /dev/random."
mircea_popescu: openssl can't be trusted to actually use
entropy in the first place.
ben_vulpes: asciilifeform: can ssl or gpg be beaten into eating a specific file of
entropy without patching them?
ben_vulpes: would be neat to dispense with linux'
entropy estimates, etc
ben_vulpes: i'm down for scarification, but only the high-
entropy kind that comes of abrading self against road
a111: Logged on 2017-01-04 08:14 davout: asciilifeform: lamport parachute generation hanging == not enough
entropy available from /dev/random ?
davout: asciilifeform: lamport parachute generation hanging == not enough
entropy available from /dev/random ?
☟︎ Framedragger: simple, high-
entropy fingerprint of a computer. In fact, the hash of the rendered image can be used almost identically to a tracking cookie by the web server."
mircea_popescu: i now have to a) generate 4kb of
entropy (roughly enough for 8 4096bit rsa keys) ; b) complete 16k operations to pad ; c) execute a 5kb rsa exponentiation. so i'm looking at what, about an hour ?
a111: Logged on 2016-08-18 12:32 mircea_popescu: asciilifeform since we're on this btw, the way i want tmsr-rsa key generation to work is as follows : a contains a number of
entropy bytes specified by user in tmsr-rsa.conf read whenever tmsr-rsa.conf specifies (such as urandom); b contains a base-tmsr string specified by user. c = base-tmsr(a).b ; p = nextprime(cut(sha512(c),257)) ; process is repeated for q = nextprime (cut(sha512(c'),258));
mircea_popescu: did you see the guy who had a "for free just as good version" consisting of buying a software radio thing (for slightly more than what FUCKGOATS costs) and you know, listening to man made "
entropy"
ben_vulpes: and a pike of
entropy sitting in the corner
mats: i remember now, there was a lack of
entropy source
a111: Logged on 2016-08-18 12:32 mircea_popescu: asciilifeform since we're on this btw, the way i want tmsr-rsa key generation to work is as follows : a contains a number of
entropy bytes specified by user in tmsr-rsa.conf read whenever tmsr-rsa.conf specifies (such as urandom); b contains a base-tmsr string specified by user. c = base-tmsr(a).b ; p = nextprime(cut(sha512(c),257)) ; process is repeated for q = nextprime (cut(sha512(c'),258));
shinohai:
Entropy works in mysterious wayz
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform i can't, not really. as pissed off as i/anyone can be, "What I currently see as best option is to actually comment out those 2 lines of code. But I have no idea what effect this really has on the RNG. The only effect I see is that the pool might receive less
entropy. But on the other hand, I'm not even sure how much
entropy some unitialised data has. What do you people think about removing those 2 lines of code?
phf: despite the schadenfreude, the amount of
entropy is disconcerting
adlai: it should be ~unique each time you run the rng, but if your '
entropy' source is a piece of data (public key), doesn't your rng turn into a p-rng?
a111: Logged on 2016-09-27 16:39 mircea_popescu: this doesn't matter so much, future cryptosystem will be made on the basis of rng ; rng can work with pubkey as
entropy source.
mircea_popescu: t2+epsilon : i publish key J in cryptosystem ? which was created with
entropy = privkey.K
mircea_popescu: this doesn't matter so much, future cryptosystem will be made on the basis of rng ; rng can work with pubkey as
entropy source.
☟︎