tmsr - Search: rsa

5100+ entries in 0.703s

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=641 (Thomas Hofmann ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/9AD29DC660DB7496B01D608486E6062A27E35F35C32CFD3E2F35FC1409374187#5C36ECF7F72E7DF2F75AB382EDB5C4F3F55890F8AAC2E9A7BF79BCCCF7E24B07>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=3 (Joe Schmuckley; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/976AAB6D6B7F325843FF0E3653C219B9D6738C5F016F72973E311181614ECAF5#928C2E1186A73348A919DFD04535B989BDD9497C80AE2DC96788955BFB99ECC9>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (Andreas Heimann ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/C62FFD2679BE0909B2C7D7FB2356995AF9650D3E280600D31534FDB9A7F170A3#A325D14C8F2FC51D65A4157508CD1E626380D8E9F340A33F11BD25BF1936DCCF>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (Matthias_Schmidt ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/B3A2E526E50140EE75C270884290DB8270F202BA7E2382F7F20D735D62E0104E#CB5B4CC7349D53137B86679F668640AC8692B8D4B44C2F782602460B0B870C06>

asciilifeform: or pill against rsa they've had since 1993 is revealed

assbot: You rated user asciilifeform on 30-Nov-2013, with a rating of 5, and supplied these additional notes: 4 First man to factor a 4096 RSA key in the history of computing..

scoopbot_revived: http://qntra.net/2015/05/weak-4096-bit-rsa-key-in-strong-set-factored-more-factored-keys-follow/

asciilifeform briefly flipped through the 'rwasa' published code, certain of finding that it links openssl, but - it told the truth; did not do so; has own rsa. can't say much else

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=12884901891 (Marco Hien ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/A627338D751C449EA54C0BA518ABCB2E215D939534F7D149C246EA9EA0D36279#2A71D1921B057ACB9C5258F5C984DF1048D6D0C9FE3FB03696525545C8A0BF98>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=459561500779 (Marco Hien ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/A627338D751C449EA54C0BA518ABCB2E215D939534F7D149C246EA9EA0D36279#3410BF059FEC317A7C927FDFD2A73249AED3B85E3AB4C4DE47EF4A23A091D5CA>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=12884901891 (PGP Corporation Update Signing Key; PGP Corporation Update Signing Key ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/0D9057DA7AEE12C725AA9408D47F4FFC3769BEF7891A0F9C0A9F38420C5C08AB#F79436B629322C70C523BAA5BE0D3D4DDA011578F84122B8CA3ABD15C52A9567>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (Sven Arnold ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/DC9D7BC1ADFF9D074C29DA18CB7224920FDAABD2348152DE296A6293FF3C1914#1A76F4EB3DC6C31C58912BB58D3C9DCDC00B82C9614792BADBFB0CE75DE943B3>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (Julia Reda ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/B412BD191BF10DAB6AAB6A8779A3F08D31AC5E3FB748DDBFB1DB18CDF05B6BEF#6269187B70BE0F1B4094A0DCA78923F50E78C97F8B3999BAB3DE5974003B393F>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (Thomas Hofmann ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/9AD29DC660DB7496B01D608486E6062A27E35F35C32CFD3E2F35FC1409374187#E5D971BED516F3DAD920A90EF1FC17998F15DC52F179A95E45EA559544E77A4D>

assbot: Phuctor Factors 100th RSA Modulus | Qntra ... ( http://bit.ly/1JCaoSf )

BingoBoingo: http://qntra.net/2015/07/phuctor-factors-100th-rsa-modulus/#comment-33817

assbot: Phuctor Factors 100th RSA Modulus | Qntra ... ( http://bit.ly/1IlKJ3K )

scoopbot_revived: Phuctor Factors 100th RSA Modulus http://qntra.net/2015/07/phuctor-factors-100th-rsa-modulus/

assbot: Logged on 22-07-2015 03:04:19; assbot: Logged on 22-07-2015 02:22:29; lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=12884901891 (PGP Corporation Update Signing Key; PGP Corporation Update Signing Key ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/0D9057DA7AEE12C725AA9408D47F4FFC3769BEF7891A0F9C0A9F38420C5C08AB#F79436B629322C70C523BAA5BE0D3D4DDA011578F84122B8CA3ABD15C52A9567>

assbot: Logged on 22-07-2015 02:22:29; lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=12884901891 (PGP Corporation Update Signing Key; PGP Corporation Update Signing Key ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/0D9057DA7AEE12C725AA9408D47F4FFC3769BEF7891A0F9C0A9F38420C5C08AB#F79436B629322C70C523BAA5BE0D3D4DDA011578F84122B8CA3ABD15C52A9567>

asciilifeform: decimation: attacker cannot glean identity from an rsa-encrypted packet sent to a known public key

decimation: sure, you could do line-speed rsa

asciilifeform: this is also why every packet is rsa-encrypted to the destination's pubkey.

mats: "I believe that we are in a post-hacker world ... We should strive to be professionals, making the Internet a safer place rather than exposing vulnerabilities that can be leveraged by criminals and terrorists. This is why I'm going to encourage you to attend professional security conferences like Black Hat, RSA, SANS and others"

nubbins`: trying to find clues as to broken implementations, flaws in rsa, etc

mod6: rsa keys

assbot: Logged on 12-07-2015 17:06:21; lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=3 (Joe Schmuckley; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/976AAB6D6B7F325843FF0E3653C219B9D6738C5F016F72973E311181614ECAF5#928C2E1186A73348A919DFD04535B989BDD9497C80AE2DC96788955BFB99ECC9>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (Paul Okkerse (Hoofd ICT) ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/DAB44446629F9CF37EB64BF72BBB6471AB6817777283D5F20F162E4FD344C3C5#B220922A162EB630FC0602375072D4B541230D8305458E827459A3C3828B5F84>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=3 (Paul Okkerse (Hoofd ICT) ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/DAB44446629F9CF37EB64BF72BBB6471AB6817777283D5F20F162E4FD344C3C5#BE5C08DD7A277168E207BFD7F45D308B8C129DF60FF8C094E8797B8AA3E3F61C>

asciilifeform: based on existing nonsense coming out of the we-don't-know-how-to-break-rsa-yet-agency

decimation: you just said, rsa can solve that problem

asciilifeform: rsa also exists, and this prevents certain other spurious items

asciilifeform: and why rsa signatures do not make it less of one

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=3 (Alex Sosa ; Xlex Sosa ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/4FC297377727D7EDA1512181888ECF02A8A5E5BC9B8406B2BF852B84F32FD55A#75FDFCD03681E98E3B4483A1D89425BD17F03693C768C1179CA1D9D0049467E3>

trinque: does p2p networking over RSA keys

decimation: you can sign time with rsa in ntp http://www.ntp.org/ntpfaq/NTP-s-config-adv.htm

decimation: I find the magic box unneeded when I can get rsa signed time from a variety of places via ntp

jurov: and if we have rsa-signed time, usg will pwn or jam that too

jurov: yes, of the first million ssh rsa keys several had factors like 3,5,7,11

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (Stephan Urbach ; Herr Urbach ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/27ABADEFA10C5A6CE3DBED175888BC9B6D5F40CC2E7895F3460AB8771B49EB17#EA05145DF780174482C93AA25649CAA45909C0CB3EC052B4B4EB0B58B5FA7348> || Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=425201762403 (Stephan Urbach ; Herr Urbach ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/27ABADEFA10C5A6CE3DBED175888BC9B6D5F40CC2E7895F

mircea_popescu: if in a decade rsa is still as strong as today...

ascii_modem: mircea_popescu: if could switch ecdsa curves, could as well have rsa!

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=30064771079 (Andreas Fleig ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/CEB08E08EEF3C71AEC185767B076C306E945E535BE55A8CAAAB9378A9F7CD4D1#E6862E9CF7D3D0B7C87FE0B186E6AB02D2020D7C5C18A25838096437544B363F> || Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=30064771079 (Andreas Fleig ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/CEB08E08EEF3C71AEC185767B076C306E945E535BE55A8CAAAB9378A9F7CD4D1#74A9FEE897AF

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (Carl Christoph Leimbrock ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/C214323FE8F5A745404185908E2CFAB4D18087093B71CDBC40C01FA883C060D4#81AFFA12771C9550E4941C4B7C4EAC93BCE4E063D36B0A6DE612AF29484357A8> || Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (Carl Christoph Leimbrock ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/C214323FE8F5A745404185908E2CFAB4D18087093B71CDBC40C01FA88

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=47244640267 (Carsten Lenz ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/3E80A6C932C0BCB3D018EB25213D1C5BD3E221289703D0ACA19D593788A802FF#F1A2E56AD8DEEA18BD1327AEF95A8556782505F49CEFA3D882D5299D14F2A2E0> || Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=33281701584453 (Carsten Lenz ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/3E80A6C932C0BCB3D018EB25213D1C5BD3E221289703D0ACA19D593788A802FF#86F4969A8F1

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=9 (Richard Monk ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/75254628CF9D61D0137B535BDE2860B51836575E4A454589D01BD586E163B445#8226AD8E1946AC4590E9AA2EA741C8AA8F472CD2156911A9913AF48A5889B1AB>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=725849473193 (Matthias Schmidt ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/F2E69ADD6FA7A630D45FC696E5CA029BC813E437CE2D25C45C80548FFE07771A#B111C17FFBD5495C25921BF0E9A048B0F9568A085886CC0F36B5CCB8B9BF0DBD>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (Tim Fiedler ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/D7B81471B4D1C2FC6AA8D6709F391B026BD1BAFEBAB21AE8BA277C1B3D054536#E284546D92DA7018662D558ED5DFAEA95B9AE98B3A61121D1379C869B054C7F8> || Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=12884901891 (Tim Fiedler ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/D7B81471B4D1C2FC6AA8D6709F391B026BD1BAFEBAB21AE8BA277C1B3D054536#90483C149C873479D

decimation: ascii_field: one wonders why bezos didn't order the creation of his own rsa code

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=5 (ptpt52; Chen Minqiang's Personal Signing Key; Chen Minqiang (The only way out is through) ; Chen Minqiang (The only way out is through) ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/238717B355D356430E5CDD3730EF66DCD17DDFC96EE34C38AE150007E7BE3786#6DEA41C50052C0B4B3D1F8AE399743EB610DEC07DCA478A6AA4C935AA2AC0286>

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=30064771079 (Raphael Randschau ; Raphael Nicolai Fabian Randschau (Uni Kiel) ; ) <http://nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/97CE2FE7747AC2CFA1531450412E093BC09E40955B7193BD37F377AE1FBD3645#4526599566CBC0905AF62AF3B6A23C1801277E6A086F645C00B8E978547C848A>

asciilifeform: (bad rsa key)

assbot: Logged on 27-06-2015 18:08:28; lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=12884901891 (Christoph Giesel ; ) || Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=12884901891 (Christoph Giesel ; )

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=11 (Trustcenter_EU ; )

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=12884901891 (Christoph Giesel ; ) || Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=12884901891 (Christoph Giesel ; ) ☟︎

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (Heiko ; ) || Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=30064771079 (Heiko ; )

felipelalli: mircea_popescu: Signature made Sex 26 Jun 2015 18:32:29 BRT using RSA key ID ED5CDE14

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=4294967297 (ms@admilon.net ; )

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=133 (Marc Enger ; Marc Enger ; )

lobbesbot: New post: http://nosuchlabs.com/rss Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=7795365644055 (Shell Arkell ; ) || Phuctored RSA Modulus, GCD=1816771166631 (Shell Arkell ; )

davout: if we find an efficient algorithm for factoring large numbers we can also kiss RSA 8192 good bye

shinohai: Thanks guy. So until such a time that RSA 4096 is broken, we're still quite safe.

mircea_popescu: what, that blowfish or whatever dies before 4096 rsa ?

asciilifeform: ~1.3M rsa-containing keys

mircea_popescu: nbews in past 6 months : s.mpoe almost went to shit but recovered, i lost the berkshire bet, s.mg launched eulora, s.nsa's phuctor delivered 60 or so broken rsa moduli

ascii_field: other thing is, only 'positive' items are even theoretically possible to authenticate. that is, if you find a leak purporting to be from the directorate-of-cracking-rsa, stating that 'sixteen quintillion bezzlars and still no result,' this could be disinfo. whereas 'here's how to factor $maxint on a pocket calculator' is testable.

assbot: On how the factored 4096 RSA keys story was handled, and what it means to you. on Trilema - A blog by Mircea Popescu. ... ( http://bit.ly/1Qz8yuy )

mircea_popescu: ugh... wrong fucking link. i meant http://trilema.com/2015/on-how-the-factored-4096-rsa-keys-story-was-handled-and-what-it-means-to-you/#comment-114526

mircea_popescu: http://log.bitcoin-assets.com/?date=08-06-2015#1157138 << you basically running a phuctor-for-rsa on your own ? give it a site! ☝︎

assbot: Logged on 08-06-2015 12:48:13; jurov: asciilifeform: mircea_popescu: so far have 733k phathub rsa keys, of these 19 have factors 3,5,17 or 23

jurov: asciilifeform: mircea_popescu: so far have 733k phathub rsa keys, of these 19 have factors 3,5,17 or 23 ☟︎

jurov: it won't stop running soon. i have in pipeline some 1e6 rsa keys from github i'd like to kindly bestow upon phuctor

asciilifeform: the mechanics of a correct phuctor are, roughly: thing keeps track of keys, rsa moduli within, as existing phuctor does; but instead of flagging 'phuctored' moduli, we keep table of known factors (associated with respective unknowns, which, in turn, may be yet-unphuctored moduli -or- fragments previously created by successful phuctorings)

trinque: happens to use RSA keys and handle fancy topologies

assbot: More factored RSA keys, and assorted other considerations on Trilema - A blog by Mircea Popescu. ... ( http://bit.ly/1AMOcHb )

ascii_field: DanyAlos: http://trilema.com/2015/more-factored-rsa-keys-and-assorted-other-considerations

mircea_popescu: curl http://mpex.co/assets/s.bbet-1F2489E8.txt | gpg gpg: Signature made Sat 05 Jan 2013 02:13:25 AM ART using RSA key ID 1F2489E8

lobbes: I'm finding it quite useful for understanding rsa fundamentals

lobbes: thanks for dropping this in the logs, alf: http://doc.sagemath.org/html/en/thematic_tutorials/numtheory_rsa.html

mircea_popescu: alphonse23_ you read http://trilema.com/2015/on-how-the-factored-4096-rsa-keys-story-was-handled-and-what-it-means-to-you/ an http://trilema.com/2015/more-factored-rsa-keys-and-assorted-other-considerations/ i expect ?

asciilifeform: alphonse23_: the idea is to find evidence of sabotaged implementations of rsa key generator.

asciilifeform: alphonse23_: basic idea, which is very old, is that euclid's greatest-common-divisor algorithm is very fast, for arbitrarily large numbers. so if two or more rsa keys were to share a factor, it will pop up.

asciilifeform: alphonse23_: 'phuctor' deals only with traditional rsa keys.