4300+ entries in 0.33s
mircea_popescu: phf in practice, once tmsr-
rsa is here, i'd expect to do exactly the "sling packets" thing
mircea_popescu: so yes, vijay menon claimed in 2013 that his implementation of agrawal-kayal-saxena took 5k seconds for a 25 digit number ; and consequently we could expect as much as 1 minute/bit or cca 4k minutes for a tmrs-
rsa key.
a111: Logged on 2016-08-18 12:32 mircea_popescu: asciilifeform since we're on this btw, the way i want tmsr-
rsa key generation to work is as follows : a contains a number of entropy bytes specified by user in tmsr-
rsa.conf read whenever tmsr-
rsa.conf specifies (such as urandom); b contains a base-tmsr string specified by user. c = base-tmsr(a).b ; p = nextprime(cut(sha512(c),257)) ; process is repeated for q = nextprime (cut(sha512(c'),258));
mircea_popescu: oh and also asciilifeform : e not to be provided by user. tmsr-
rsa uses 0x010001 and that's that.
mircea_popescu: seems certain kock-
rsa aka "gnupg" is getting uprooted.
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform sha512 and cut to be defined by user ; with the caveat that if they don't produce a min of 258 bytes / 257 258 bytes user is taking life in his own hands. we provide defaults (keccak , "take first nth bytes" respectrively). key size NOT to be defined by user ; tmsr-
rsa keys are al 515 bytes long.
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform since we're on this btw, the way i want tmsr-
rsa key generation to work is as follows : a contains a number of entropy bytes specified by user in tmsr-
rsa.conf read whenever tmsr-
rsa.conf specifies (such as urandom); b contains a base-tmsr string specified by user. c = base-tmsr(a).b ; p = nextprime(cut(sha512(c),257)) ; process is repeated for q = nextprime (cut(sha512(c'),258));
☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎ mircea_popescu: anyway, seems proper tmsr-
rsa will have to come sooner rather than later.
mod6: downloaded most
RSA keys from a keyserver and tried to factor 1.9
mircea_popescu: yes, we're adjusting the meaning of
rsa-crypto to explicitly not care, as discussed yest. but this is novel.
mircea_popescu: nevertheless - we're fortunate, in that the job for eulora is for
rsa only.
mircea_popescu: now asciilifeform if cs were well specified and well understood from usage ; i wouldn't be against making "key" ambiguous as to which of
rsa, cs it is.
mircea_popescu: should we tomorrow move to cs crypto, there'd be no reason to "upgrade" "extant"
rsa keys.
mircea_popescu: it's not "the sks server" that is retarded. is the concept of machine-spread
rsa key that's retarded ; much in the way of "machine-generated trust", be it embodied in "dao" or "colored coins" or "safe bitbet"
☟︎☟︎ mircea_popescu: machine processes ; people spread/administer. that's
rsa key lifecycle.
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform ideally tmsr
rsa, such as for eulora etc, uses a fp and armored base90 as above. so there!
mircea_popescu: yeah this entire "id of
rsa key" thing needs a fix. i imagine sha512 of tmsr standard is the only way to go.
a111: Logged on 2016-08-01 19:47 deedbot: [Recent Phuctorings.] Phuctored: 126044733741731328742413066718552314382419228167112456334027928884317367999330241024168451126326383475145520025295451544372438227070210798265767098934250820341305937931860061514790268968891523470454082874208728274680634763462042122485524526243688604432591998753006364684812749745538152702859571396997177876337 divides
RSA Moduli belonging to '<>&%"\${}`'deadbeef1; ' -
http://phuctor.nosuchlabs.com/gpgkey/617706D7A6FC1817D01 jurov: "The Million-Key Question—Investigating the Origins of
RSA Public Keys"
mircea_popescu: anyway : the
rsa/otp scheme is also bw-wasting, up to a factor of 2 if no hashing, or otherwise depending on how many hash passes, with 20 it's just 1.05 ie 5% more bw etc.
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform you understand that if you never hash them, you might as well not use them at all and simply
rsa the actual message back and forth. as appealing as the idea is in theory, it's not workable in practice because even with a game as relaxed as eulora, it'll still be too laggy.
ben_vulpes: actually greenwald schmeenwald you backed *anyone* who suggested the use of anything other than
RSA.
a111: Logged on 2016-08-06 18:43 deedbot: [Recent Phuctorings.] Phuctored: 12162511443944070773219991934677582698468209730498855355911521948607449303537567609416882598773485743668093728963053579135929514188223460244897500435488727 divides
RSA Moduli belonging to '197.221.61.38 (ssh-
rsa key from 197.221.61.38 (13-14 June 2016 extraction) for Phuctor import. Ask asciilifeform or framedragger on Freenode, or email fd at mkj dot lt) <sshscan-queries+197.221.61
a111: Logged on 2016-08-06 19:01 deedbot: [Recent Phuctorings.] Phuctored: 12162511443944070773219991934677582698468209730498855355911521948607449303537567609416882598773485743668093728963053579135929514188223460244897500435488727 divides
RSA Moduli belonging to '197.221.61.38 (ssh-
rsa key from 197.221.61.38 (13-14 June 2016 extraction) for Phuctor import. Ask asciilifeform or framedragger on Freenode, or email fd at mkj dot lt) <sshscan-queries+197.221.61
deedbot: [Recent Phuctorings.] Phuctored: 12162511443944070773219991934677582698468209730498855355911521948607449303537567609416882598773485743668093728963053579135929514188223460244897500435488727 divides
RSA Moduli belonging to '197.221.61.38 (ssh-
rsa key from 197.221.61.38 (13-14 June 2016 extraction) for Phuctor import. Ask asciilifeform or framedragger on Freenode, or email fd at mkj dot lt) <sshscan-queries+197.221.61.38@mkj.lt>; ' -
http://phuctor.nosuchla ☟︎ deedbot: [Recent Phuctorings.] Phuctored: 12162511443944070773219991934677582698468209730498855355911521948607449303537567609416882598773485743668093728963053579135929514188223460244897500435488727 divides
RSA Moduli belonging to '197.221.63.150 (ssh-
rsa key from 197.221.63.150 (13-14 June 2016 extraction) for Phuctor import. Ask asciilifeform or framedragger on Freenode, or email fd at mkj dot lt) <sshscan-queries+197.221.63.150@mkj.lt>; ' -
http://phuctor.nosuc deedbot: [Recent Phuctorings.] Phuctored: 12162511443944070773219991934677582698468209730498855355911521948607449303537567609416882598773485743668093728963053579135929514188223460244897500435488727 divides
RSA Moduli belonging to '197.221.61.38 (ssh-
rsa key from 197.221.61.38 (13-14 June 2016 extraction) for Phuctor import. Ask asciilifeform or framedragger on Freenode, or email fd at mkj dot lt) <sshscan-queries+197.221.61.38@mkj.lt>; ' -
http://phuctor.nosuchla ☟︎ deedbot: [Recent Phuctorings.] Phuctored: 13118913265992357713749906968914856459229448329385353928317865240153186990772616410386066804476994406481496060266687741570826925431077185850750051547683307 divides
RSA Moduli belonging to '112.16.65.245 (ssh-
rsa key from 112.16.65.245 (13-14 June 2016 extraction) for Phuctor import. Ask asciilifeform or framedragger on Freenode, or email fd at mkj dot lt) <sshscan-queries+112.16.65.245@mkj.lt>; ' -
http://phuctor.nosuchla deedbot: [Recent Phuctorings.] Phuctored: 13118913265992357713749906968914856459229448329385353928317865240153186990772616410386066804476994406481496060266687741570826925431077185850750051547683307 divides
RSA Moduli belonging to '112.16.65.247 (ssh-
rsa key from 112.16.65.247 (13-14 June 2016 extraction) for Phuctor import. Ask asciilifeform or framedragger on Freenode, or email fd at mkj dot lt) <sshscan-queries+112.16.65.247@mkj.lt>; ' -
http://phuctor.nosuchla a111: Logged on 2016-08-05 00:40 mircea_popescu: "Testing
RSA keys after generation is a fool's quest. This is a nice thing to do to detect some poor implementations, not poor keys. Moreover, it detects only certain classes of poor keys (specifically, those with small factors). It does not detect poorly seeded RNG used in an otherwise correct
RSA private key generation." << god i love reading year-old webwisdom/community consensusi.
mircea_popescu: "Testing
RSA keys after generation is a fool's quest. This is a nice thing to do to detect some poor implementations, not poor keys. Moreover, it detects only certain classes of poor keys (specifically, those with small factors). It does not detect poorly seeded RNG used in an otherwise correct
RSA private key generation." << god i love reading year-old webwisdom/community consensusi.
☟︎ fromphuctor: I know that, it works well only on non-properly-generated
rsa modulus, which is easily factorizable by 2^x -1
mircea_popescu: it just doesn't actually speak to the foregoing. i suppose the correct
rsa implementation comes with a kernel patch.
mircea_popescu: when we reimplement
rsa plox : a) either p length odd and q length even or vice-versa ; b) neither within 1 of a lattice power
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform btw re the fermat discussion, i wonder if anyone ever did a proper review of
rsa code for lattice and fermat-closeness weakness in p,q generation.
nosuchlabswww: Not trying to spam. Check out qntra dot net. Fourth article down is about
rsa and brought me here. Good read and new article.
fabio__: your said "fabio__
rsa has the advantage that it's the simpler solution."
mircea_popescu: you mean, "alternatives for
rsa are not worth contemplating" ? sure, they are, much like anything's worth contemplating. it's educative if nothing else.
fabio__: so in your mind, new comers are not worth considering
RSA unless they are equivalent in complexity or simpler. and until
RSA is broken no need to migrate? <-- is this fair?
mircea_popescu: if someone breaks
rsa you have all sorts of other problems to contend with.
mircea_popescu: fabio__
rsa is not breakable in the "shit someone broke openssl" sense you seem to be thinking of.
fabio__: so in your mind, new comers are not worth considering
RSA unless they are equivalent in complexity or simpler. and until
RSA is broken no need to migrate?
mircea_popescu: fabio__
rsa has the advantage that it's the simpler solution. i thought i said this before.
nosuchlabswww: Not really. Just read about phuctor and the square
rsa keys and shit.