2500+ entries in 0.183s

a111: Logged on 2017-04-09 14:45 mircea_popescu: asciilifeform incidentally, the more i think about it the more i'm convinced the ONLY "fingerprint" for
rsa key may be... the modulus. 4096 bits and fuck you, if you can't take 32 chars you don't belong here.
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform incidentally, the more i think about it the more i'm convinced the ONLY "fingerprint" for
rsa key may be... the modulus. 4096 bits and fuck you, if you can't take 32 chars you don't belong here.
☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎ Framedragger: mircea_popescu: i mean that not *all* new entries are included,
rsa truncates, them, too. asciilifeform can confirm tho.
Framedragger: i don't think
rsa gives all, just 'first 10' or sth
Framedragger:
rsa truncates, etc etc, other methods (pg notify / etc as mentioned by trinque) require asciilifeform's intervention
mircea_popescu: tmsr relies on a
rsa-based wot implementation. for instance
BenBE: mircea_popescu: I planned on DSA/ECDSA, but that's quite low on the priority list right now. Attack on both works somewhat different and requires data collection not as easily obtained as with
RSA.
Framedragger: not only self-signed - in
https you can have public
rsa key but with additional 'chain' of imperial. still extractable
mircea_popescu: i guess could try and fish out the actual
rsa keys from self-signed certs maybe
Framedragger: mircea_popescu: sure. but there are
rsa keys in
https certs out there. but yet to be empirically approached and estimated, sure
mircea_popescu: i dun expect we're going to be doing anything but
rsa because well... how ?
ben_vulpes: fromloper: interested in factoring
rsa keys?
mircea_popescu: into a more reasonable (ssh-
rsa key from 60.213.15.140 13-14 June 2016 extraction) ?
mircea_popescu: <tr><td>60.213.15.140 (ssh-
rsa key from 60.213.15.140 (13-14 June 2016 extraction) for Phuctor import. Ask asciilifeform or framedragger on Freenode, or email fd at mkj dot lt) <sshscan-queries+60.213.15.140@mkj.lt>; </td></tr>
Framedragger: last note mircea_popescu, paper in question does acknowledge the fact that as regards
rsa factorisation, their attempt is a *replication* (unless i misread). but yes, should be beaten for not mentioning phuctor.
mircea_popescu: in what sense first (actually) biggest (actually) project to factor
rsa is "not that important" ? who did something more important in the interval and what was it ?
Framedragger: i mean, a large part of the paper is exposition.
rsa, dht (relevant to how onion services work), etc.; so, it's not *interesting*. but it's not in any particular way shitty. i wouldn't have read it otherwise and certainly do not see it as very valuable.
Framedragger: possible weaknesses of
rsa keys and the idea to run a "your relay key is weak" service as part of tor metrics infrastructure (tor metrics itself is an old project, ca. 2011)