584600+ entries in 0.346s

rithm: proprietary .idx files and stuff. always plaintext
though
rithm: it hits plain
text viewable docs, even weird proprietary ones
rithm: it only hits plain
text
rithm: but it's be
trivial
to exfiltrate compressed
text, sure
BingoBoingo: Well yes, normally seems
to stay on victim's computer, but if
they can lock
the files,
they can include other shitware
rithm: the only data exfiltrated
to my knowledge is
the decryption key and an identifier for
the machine
rithm: not immediately although
that could be a later payload
rithm: well it's my understanding
the data is not exfiltrated
TomServo: It's extracted? I
thought it was just locked inplace.
BingoBoingo: I imagine eventually
the ransomware people will start browsing what
they've seized
rithm: documented sources where
the FBI actually makes
the recommendation
to pay
the ransom is useful
to me
rithm: i shared
that with my
team
rithm: yeah i was gonna say where is
the citation
assbot: Dickson County
Tennessee Sheriff Hit with Ransomware, Pays | Qntra.net
jurov: let
them ask it back from irs
jurov: maybe you can even charge
tax
to
the desperate people
dub: your dealer doesnt
take btc?
jurov: you'd have
to register as std..er..money
transmitter?
jurov: xanthyos wants
to buy coins, you need some $$$
xanthyos: if it crashes, my purchase goes
through, if it goes
to
the moon, coinbase will cancel
the
transaction
undata: xanthyos:
that should've been expected with such a sharp rise.
xanthyos: ^^ proof positive
that jesus hates me
xanthyos: why does btc always crash
the second i buy it
xanthyos: come mr
towel man
towel my banana
thestringpuller: asciilifeform: can't imagine i'm
the only one,
though. << you aren't
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ticker | Best bid: 399.08, Best ask: 399.97, Bid-ask spread: 0.89000, Last
trade: 399.98, 24 hour volume: 49575.14498042, 24 hour low: 381.55, 24 hour high: 453.92, 24 hour vwap: 429.779216449
mrjr: got a blog / post on
the issue you're describing? sounds interesting
mrjr: i wasnt aware
there was politics behind nlock. always considered it as potentially very useful.
mrjr: that includes internal
theft.
mrjr: inaccessible = nobody can sign, because
the key no longer exists.
mrjr: the remaining 200k+ BTC can be stored in a form
that is in-accessible
to
the operator, and unavailable for "rogue
txs"
that steal everything
mrjr: we saw
that with just 1,000 BTC accessible
to
the operators,
they could cover 96% of
their Bitcoin withdrawal needs
mrjr: (put asside
their entire fiasco, just
the data)
mrjr: we ran
the scenario on
the withdraw data from gox
joecool: punkman: it has
to be both
punkman: asciilifeform: nlocktime is block height I
think
mrjr: did i explain sufficiently
the motivation part?
jurov: <asciilifeform> punkman: germany has same electric rates for residential and commercial lines <<
they do have lower wholesale prices where you have
to obey
the grid management regime, dunno about details
mrjr: discarding
the privkey is a measure against internal
theft, which is key
to
this scheme
mrjr: if
the attacker has access
to all your
txs in unlocked version,
they can indeed run away with everything
mrjr: however you could publish
those
txs on your blog for all you care
mrjr: you still need a cron,
to send
the nlocked
txs every day
mrjr: "when you sent
them manually"
mrjr: the why is:
the operators of
the ATM no longer have a need
to reach out for
the cold-stored 1000 BTC
mrjr: you pre-sign
the
txs
that move
the remaining 1000 BTC - x days
to a non-practical multisig
mrjr: you do not broadcast
those
tx, you just keep
the
txs, signed, and discard
the privkey
to your 1000 BTC (!)
mrjr: say you presign 50 BTC / day
to a given ATM, coming from your stash of 1000 BTC.
mrjr: i'll
take your example and explain
mrjr: there's an alternative pre-signed
transaction chain
that sends
the coins
to alternative addresses, possibly more protected, and a pre-signed "lockdown"
transaction
that just sends
the coins
to a non-practical (from an operation standpoint) multisig
mrjr: 't broadcast
the
txs
to
that address
mrjr: think of
the daily needs of
those machines, vs
the amount stored "in cold storage" using
traditional systems
mrjr: asciilifeform: you're right, but by pre-signing you ensure
that
the amounts available at
that address, per unit
time, are limited. our first partners are ATM machine operators
Pierre_Rochard: “i'll work on getting my creds in order :)” <-
translation: “I won’t work on
that, and here’s an insincere smile
to really reinforce what I
think of it”
mrjr: i'm also
the founder of Bits of Gold,
the largest exchange in Israel
mrjr: thestringpuller: i'll work on getting my creds in order :) meni rosenfeld is one of our investors, and our cto Shaul Kfir was a reviewer for
the sidechain paper.
mrjr: thestringpuller:
the greater product is larger in scope
mrjr: thestringpuller: our first service is just what you wrote, giving
the network a means
to
trust
that a
tx will be valid on
time (unless ofcourse it was double spent, in which case you get notified)
thestringpuller: conclusion: our service holds burden of
trust for
time delay
transactions
mrjr: the
tech is useful e.g. for an exchange/bank
that keeps large amounts of BTC, but has a daily use for BTC as clients withdraw funds.
mrjr: we're working on a whitepaper
to have some feedback on our design :)