log☇︎
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rithm: proprietary .idx files and stuff. always plaintext though
rithm: it hits plain text viewable docs, even weird proprietary ones
rithm: it only hits plain text
rithm: but it's be trivial to exfiltrate compressed text, sure
BingoBoingo: Well yes, normally seems to stay on victim's computer, but if they can lock the files, they can include other shitware
rithm: the only data exfiltrated to my knowledge is the decryption key and an identifier for the machine
asciilifeform: virtually nobody dredges through a chumpnet's entire accessible data set, on account of this being very much like actual work.
rithm: not immediately although that could be a later payload
rithm: well it's my understanding the data is not exfiltrated
TomServo: It's extracted? I thought it was just locked inplace.
asciilifeform: BingoBoingo: traditionally 'ransomware' doesn't exfiltrate
BingoBoingo: I imagine eventually the ransomware people will start browsing what they've seized
rithm: documented sources where the FBI actually makes the recommendation to pay the ransom is useful to me
rithm: i shared that with my team
asciilifeform: gotta love these idiots. when'll somebody edit, rather than simply wiping, the case files ?
BingoBoingo: citation is now there.
rithm: yeah i was gonna say where is the citation
asciilifeform: BingoBoingo: missing link in there?
assbot: Dickson County Tennessee Sheriff Hit with Ransomware, Pays | Qntra.net
asciilifeform: it's of more use to me as a scientific toy than as a few new tires for car or a dozen spare disks.
asciilifeform: apologies if i've given someone, somewhere, the strange notion that i'm interested in parting with my microscopic collection of btc.
asciilifeform: let's put it this way. a pile of usd without at least seven or eight decimally-significant zeros trailing after it, would make absolutely no difference to how i live.
asciilifeform: other thing is, i don't have enough to sell, and present exchange rates being, to really notice the resulting pile of usd, even if it could magically land in my usd piggy without official attention.
jurov: let them ask it back from irs
jurov: maybe you can even charge tax to the desperate people
dub: your dealer doesnt take btc?
asciilifeform: jurov: i'd be charged tax, most likely
jurov: you'd have to register as std..er..money transmitter?
asciilifeform: jurov: if bezzle usd, then it's on the radar.
asciilifeform: last farmer's market of the year on my street is tonight, and i shall be buying a few tomatoes possibly with it
asciilifeform: jurov: except that i can't use paper usd for anything
jurov: xanthyos wants to buy coins, you need some $$$
xanthyos: if it crashes, my purchase goes through, if it goes to the moon, coinbase will cancel the transaction
undata: xanthyos: that should've been expected with such a sharp rise.
xanthyos: ^^ proof positive that jesus hates me
xanthyos: why does btc always crash the second i buy it
xanthyos: come mr towel man towel my banana
thestringpuller: asciilifeform: can't imagine i'm the only one, though. << you aren't
gribble: Bitstamp BTCUSD ticker | Best bid: 399.08, Best ask: 399.97, Bid-ask spread: 0.89000, Last trade: 399.98, 24 hour volume: 49575.14498042, 24 hour low: 381.55, 24 hour high: 453.92, 24 hour vwap: 429.779216449
asciilifeform: can't imagine i'm the only one, though.
asciilifeform: afaik this here is the only place you'll hear the argument.
mrjr: got a blog / post on the issue you're describing? sounds interesting
mrjr: i wasnt aware there was politics behind nlock. always considered it as potentially very useful.
asciilifeform: so sorely missing from bitcoin from the point of view of the enemy.
asciilifeform: bip64, aside from complicating the protocol and giving relevance to the gavin shitgang, is also a jam-tomorrow chumpatronic engineering structural element ☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎
asciilifeform: alice in the looking-glass, famously is offered 'jam tomorrow and jam yesterday -- but never jam today.'
asciilifeform admits that he suspects bip64 of being a plot to create usg-like bonds in btc. folks will be asked to trace X proper btc for X+epsilon 'locked' ones that are to land back in their pocket 'in the future', should they live long enough, but are actually recovable 'because this is how the world works' ☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎☟︎
mrjr: that includes internal theft.
mrjr: inaccessible = nobody can sign, because the key no longer exists.
mrjr: the remaining 200k+ BTC can be stored in a form that is in-accessible to the operator, and unavailable for "rogue txs" that steal everything
mrjr: we saw that with just 1,000 BTC accessible to the operators, they could cover 96% of their Bitcoin withdrawal needs
mrjr: (put asside their entire fiasco, just the data)
mrjr: we ran the scenario on the withdraw data from gox
joecool: punkman: it has to be both
asciilifeform reads the thing
punkman: asciilifeform: nlocktime is block height I think
mrjr: did i explain sufficiently the motivation part?
asciilifeform: if a critical mass of ntp servers (e.g. the u.s. hierarchy) is pwned, there go your timelocks.
jurov: <asciilifeform> punkman: germany has same electric rates for residential and commercial lines << they do have lower wholesale prices where you have to obey the grid management regime, dunno about details
asciilifeform: which is not something that currently afflicts node operators
asciilifeform: the other, unrelated point about the timelock business, is that it introduces an incentive to monkey with timekeeping
mrjr: discarding the privkey is a measure against internal theft, which is key to this scheme
mrjr: if the attacker has access to all your txs in unlocked version, they can indeed run away with everything
asciilifeform: what does the 'lock' prevent the enemy from doing, that he could have done otherwise ?
mrjr: however you could publish those txs on your blog for all you care
joecool: then what's the point -_-
mrjr: you still need a cron, to send the nlocked txs every day
asciilifeform: you want the btc network to be your 'cron' ?
asciilifeform: if you like to keep the privkey to the 1000 buried in concrete at the bottom of the sea - you can sign X tx'es of B btc each, and transmit those each day with cron job
mrjr: "when you sent them manually"
asciilifeform: when you sent to them manually each day.
mrjr: the why is: the operators of the ATM no longer have a need to reach out for the cold-stored 1000 BTC
mrjr: you pre-sign the txs that move the remaining 1000 BTC - x days to a non-practical multisig
asciilifeform: i understand the 'what.' but not the 'why.'
mrjr: you do not broadcast those tx, you just keep the txs, signed, and discard the privkey to your 1000 BTC (!)
mrjr: say you presign 50 BTC / day to a given ATM, coming from your stash of 1000 BTC.
mrjr: i'll take your example and explain
asciilifeform: in the case of delay mechanism: you've broadcast a set of delayed transactions that will keep landing in the now-stolen addr. nightly.
mrjr: there's an alternative pre-signed transaction chain that sends the coins to alternative addresses, possibly more protected, and a pre-signed "lockdown" transaction that just sends the coins to a non-practical (from an operation standpoint) multisig
asciilifeform: take ordinary, delay-less coin. you fill up the atm's addr nightly, say. if you are told that someone walked away with the machine, you no longer send to that one.
asciilifeform: what's the actual purpose of the delay ?
mrjr: 't broadcast the txs to that address
asciilifeform: if you already broadcast the delayed tx, all the thief has to do is wait.
asciilifeform: per unit time. but what can you do if someone walks with the privkey to the landing address?
mrjr: think of the daily needs of those machines, vs the amount stored "in cold storage" using traditional systems
mrjr: asciilifeform: you're right, but by pre-signing you ensure that the amounts available at that address, per unit time, are limited. our first partners are ATM machine operators
asciilifeform: ;;later tell jurov nothing in my mailbox from turdatron.
asciilifeform: mrjr: delayed transaction, per that scheme, still eventually lands in an addr. secured with what if not priv key ?
asciilifeform: mrjr: secure your bitcoins in nlocked transactions rather than protecting the priv key << wai wat.
Pierre_Rochard: “i'll work on getting my creds in order :)” <- translation: “I won’t work on that, and here’s an insincere smile to really reinforce what I think of it”
mrjr: i'm also the founder of Bits of Gold, the largest exchange in Israel
mrjr: thestringpuller: i'll work on getting my creds in order :) meni rosenfeld is one of our investors, and our cto Shaul Kfir was a reviewer for the sidechain paper.
thestringpuller: cause you are the trustee
mrjr: thestringpuller: the greater product is larger in scope
mrjr: thestringpuller: our first service is just what you wrote, giving the network a means to trust that a tx will be valid on time (unless ofcourse it was double spent, in which case you get notified)
mats_cd03: i don't see how thats useful
thestringpuller: but you already know that.
thestringpuller: conclusion: our service holds burden of trust for time delay transactions
mrjr: the tech is useful e.g. for an exchange/bank that keeps large amounts of BTC, but has a daily use for BTC as clients withdraw funds.
mrjr: we're working on a whitepaper to have some feedback on our design :)