asciilifeform: in fact, as far as i can tell, this has ~never been done at all~
asciilifeform: the gotcha is, there is no shortage of demonstrably np-complete problem classes; but converting one into a cryptosystem, esp. ~safely~ is nontrivial
asciilifeform: i actually hit garey & johnson's mega-encyclopaedia 'intractability' and dug☟︎
asciilifeform expected to see the maths crackpots come out in full strength, propose martian oddities based on, e.g., graph isomorphisms problem, or vertex colouring
asciilifeform: if this is the best anybody had to offer, the field is deader than i thought.
asciilifeform: re: the cipher thread, gotta love how nobody complained re: mircea_popescu asking folks to solve an unsolved mathematical problem, the answer to which eluded two great empires for half a century.
asciilifeform: and in the 'roadmap' link we specifically see 'xilinx.'
asciilifeform: ^ 'open toolchain fpga' will happen some time after pigs fly over a frozen hell.
asciilifeform: 'it cost $300,000 per nuclear bomb to recall bombs to Pantex to remove and repair Sandia's failing semiconductor chips.'
asciilifeform: pitch that Crypto AG was a neutral company and its equipment was the best. They were Swiss, after all. [3] Crypto AG eventually paid one million dollars for Buehler's release in January 1993, then promptly fired him once they had reassured themselves that he hadn't revealed anything important under interrogation, and because Buehler had begun to ask some embarrassing questions.'
asciilifeform: 'Iran demonstrated its suspicion about the source of the leaks, when it arrested Hans Buehler, a top salesman for Crypto AG, in Teheran on March 18, 1992. During his nine and a half months of solitary confinement in Evin prison in Teheran, Buehler was questioned again and again whether he had leaked Teheran's codes or Libya's keys to Western powers. Luckily Buehler didn't know anything. He in fact believed in his own sales
asciilifeform: yne%20Tutors%20RSA%20and%20NSA.htm While I was project leader of the missile secure cryptographic unit in the 1980, NSA cryptographer Brian Snow gave some of us Sandians a lecture on NSA crypto units. Snow showed actual devices and schematics. Snow also commented on field failures. NSA algoritms I saw were based on shift register and combinatoric algorithms.
asciilifeform: Anonymous said... 'NSA began to remove public key crypto implementations from weapons in about 1991. Sandia cryptographer Gus Simmons suggested to NSA and Sandia that NSA replace the shift register-based Benincasa algorithm in the ctbt data authenticator with public key. I was ordered by my supervior, Dr John Holovka [chemist] to explain what Simmons was talking about. http://www.prosefights.org/nmlegal/mcconnell/pacer/Pa
asciilifeform: on the bright side, in the ancient comment threads, we find the inevitable articulate crackpot! :
asciilifeform: millions of mediocrities collectively bukkakeing onto paper.☟︎
asciilifeform: the triumph of 'ordinary science' as described by kuhn.☟︎
asciilifeform: there is no 'provably hard' ~anything~ available, the WHOLE MOTHERFUCKING FIELD is, as far as the eye can see, pseudomathematical turdmeistery
asciilifeform: and found... the thing that koblitz describes
asciilifeform: i took an interest in 'provably hard' crypto
asciilifeform: this hammer hit me in the face the first time around (as a young man, when i had notions of actually making a living in that field, and recoiled in disgust, having encountered something quite similar to what is described in tarver's and moldbug's essays)
asciilifeform: and, on the other side, the ludicrous, when seen from outside, deluge of pseudomathematical claptrap that now passes for 'computer science research'
asciilifeform: k's essay was really about 'fits in head'
asciilifeform: but koblitz attacked his meal ticket, yes
