asciilifeform: aha. let'em sell tickets. that can be resold at markup.
asciilifeform: though on second thought this algo is, from certain angle, ancient, it is how everything from plane tickets, concert tickets, gladiatorial match tickets, have always been sold
asciilifeform: mircea_popescu: eh the boojum'll turn up. it is not given to ~anybody to invent 2 nice algos...
asciilifeform: (if there is a shortage of casks coming to me from upstream -- i raise my price for downstream. etc)
asciilifeform: would be pretty smooth 'plane tickets' market, imho.
asciilifeform: incidentally each level of the pyramid could automagically price the casks he issues.
asciilifeform: i challenge the good folx here to find the lethal boojum in this algo. because it almost seems workable.
asciilifeform: and at the same time grade nodes by degree of promise-keeping, as described by mircea_popescu .
asciilifeform: with this algo, you can in fact market access to a miner. and n levels out.
asciilifeform: scheme pictured above does suffer from the 'no canned tx' headache. but it does solve the 'miner eats 100% of cake, the rest -- do laundry' thing.
asciilifeform: the terminal sig can belong to a node, rather than a miner, if miners prove resistant to signing anything
asciilifeform: mircea_popescu: if he wants to make promises -- they gotta be opposable
asciilifeform: h1 is the sig of 1st hop from miner; h2 - second; etc.
asciilifeform: to rewrite formally, a cask is a C = sig_h1(sig_h2(sig_h3(.....sig_m('i'll mine a tx for q btc/kb...'))); tx author signs, author_sig(my_tx + C)
asciilifeform: 2 ) the miner-and-node fee is cut up according to the promised scheme.
asciilifeform: when he mines it : 1) all of the participants know whether he has kept his promise; and whether each level of pyramid has kept its promise;
asciilifeform: the mature tx resulting from this process, makes its way back upstream to the miner.
asciilifeform: at the bottom of the pyramid, a tx author requests a cask from a node, and fills it (assigns his node-and-miner fee to the caskchain specified by the hash he was given.)
asciilifeform: these in turn issue casks. and pass'em on downstream.
asciilifeform: here is how it'd work, roughly. a miner generates rsa-signed messages , occasionally, let's call'em 'empty casks'. a cask consists of a declaration, 'i'll include a tx within N blocks, i promise, for Q btc/kByte; and oh, here's a nonce.' the casks are distributed to the next level of nodes away from the miner ;
asciilifeform: discounted riders -- yes. free - not afaik
asciilifeform: it is -ev to have any (aside from 'loyalty points' chumps and similar)
asciilifeform: yet sane airline does not pack empty chairs with free riders.
asciilifeform: but if you could fly anywhere for 0 money, supposing your were willing to do it on some unknown date up to month in the future -- quite a few folx would
asciilifeform: it is possible that the planets simply aligned for me, the gods smiled, every single time.
asciilifeform: now, granted, this was not an industrial-grade survey.
asciilifeform: and i did not have to suck anything behind the curtain...
asciilifeform: mircea_popescu: my puzzlement is re the continued existence of 0fee in conjunction with 'blocks are crowded.' can you picture a city where trains are full to bursting point, but they continue letting a third of the passengers in for free ?!
asciilifeform: but mircea_popescu nails it, the block subsidy makes it largely uninteresting to bother with squeezing the most tx fee from every available byte of ullage in block
asciilifeform: there's a difference between 'mostly' and 'actually no strings'
asciilifeform: ( bottling it was , with tech of the period, -ev )
asciilifeform: the way i see the empty blocks, and mass of 0fee tx, is that it resembles the old days of petro drilling , when natural gas was flared off
asciilifeform: (if i landed, a martian, on earth, and found that almost all beer is given out for free and with 0 strings attached - i would infer that beer is a type of industrial waste..)
asciilifeform: mircea_popescu: if it is a market, it is 'buyer's market'
asciilifeform: wasn't referring to the d00d with the cock ring, but to 'i have control of an addr with btc in it, and willing to pay the market rate fee, mine my tx' arbitrary martian.
asciilifeform: http://btcbase.org/log/2017-02-27#1619482 << right now, keeping a node is -ev for almost everyone who could be doing it. only oddballs with countereconomic motivation of one kind or another (e.g., trb experimenters) , plus miners themselves, plus serious txers ( e.g., mircea_popescu ) have a desire to do it. there are not so many of these. it is rather like relying on entirely on coprophagics for your sewage disposal needs.☝︎
asciilifeform: seems like oddball masochism gear, i've never seen it outside of mircea_popescu's links..
asciilifeform: mircea_popescu: lol what is what, a veterinary autocastrator ?
asciilifeform: incidentally it'd also test trinque's 'miners out in the open' thing. miner who comes out of the curtains, could collect 100% of the fee, rather than what relays left behind
asciilifeform: if anything, nuking the possibility of pools (as for instance i favour) would exacerbate it.
asciilifeform: trinque: say we stick to the trb-i thread. gotta specify what specifically about your concept of trbi, that would remove the incentive for miner secrecy that exists in classical bitcoin.
asciilifeform: trinque: just don't be surprised when other nodes drop you
asciilifeform: trinque: this is doable right now, you can comment out the mempool in trb...
asciilifeform: mircea_popescu: phrased this way, it elementarily falls down. q was whether you could do the deed ~without~ promisetronics
asciilifeform: so i'll be the 1st to tell trinque 'thanks'
asciilifeform: i'd like to connect dulap to one, instead of trudging through ocean of prb
asciilifeform: trinque: go and draw a chinese miner into the open, today..?
asciilifeform: mircea_popescu: if it 'wants to be free', tell me my p and q aha.
asciilifeform: actually i know an algo that does this. will post it later, if it isn't obvious to mircea_popescu et al after a few minutes' thought.☟︎
asciilifeform: ( to cement this down for l0gz readers : what you'd need is a mechanism for pubkey-signing some material already signed by another pubkey, whereby the original signature is preserved -- not necessarily bitwise, but in the sense of remaining fully verifiable -- but the new one is not strippable off with any reasonable amount of cpu cycle )
asciilifeform: theoretically you ~could~ have a leaktight hose where hop1 takes a % of a 'node and miner fee' preallocated by tx author; hop2 takes ~his own~ % of what hop1 left on the table; and so forth. but the requisite mathematical device for protocolically encumbering a tx is afaik undiscovered.
