471300+ entries in 0.261s
bad_duck: hmm, mine has,
things like
that :
bad_duck: danielpbarron: dependd if
the node is running for a long
time, it has it after
the initial sync (and some missing / wrong poing after downtime when resync / getting last blocks)
danielpbarron: i don't
think debug.log would give you
the info you want
bad_duck: danielpbarron: anyway I want some more data so I'm looking for someone who is listening
the network for a long
time / has logs
bad_duck: danielpbarron: yes, I have
this info in my debug.log but my node is only running for 1-2 months...
bad_duck: danielpbarron | data signed by WoT members <-- I hope
to find a "relyable" person, but yes I'll have
to
trust him
danielpbarron: does debug.log record
the date from
the block? or
the
time on my computer when
the block was relayed?
funkenstein_: bad_duck, if you can't rely on
the
timestamps on
the blocks what
timestamps can you rely on?
trinque: do I understand correctly
that you use a "signing key"
to sign your various subkeys,
thus associating
them with one identity?
trinque: and aside
that, may
the words should, associated, and all other "ignore
the gap"
terms be put
to
the spike
BingoBoingo: mircea_popescu:
tbh, someone has
to explain
this "subkeys" retardation
to me sometime. fucking pseudohierarchy devoid of meaning. << Within your big GPG keyblock you can have multiple keys, say a 4096 RSA for signing and another 4096
to encrypt
to. Beyond
that you can keep stuffing moar keys in
there just because...
danielpbarron: Bram Cohen: It's difficult for me
to convey just how profoundly idiotic
the BitShare mining chip is.
mircea_popescu: for some reason i was
thinking you're doing rabin-miller
mircea_popescu: no, you run it multiple
times because it's probabilistic.
Apocalyptic: after 430 runs
the probability of error is something like 1/e if I remember and if
this doc is correct
Apocalyptic: I will post a report if it leads
to something, or if somebody wants it
mircea_popescu: Apocalyptic you know it'd be halpful if youactually counted
them / documented
the attempts
Apocalyptic: I guess i'm gonna have
to keep increasing it for a while
Apocalyptic: mircea_popescu, rho pollard plus countless iterations of ECM for reasonable bounds assuming
there is a 20-30 prime digit factor in
the modulus reminder
Apocalyptic: I suppose it's
the same as
the master one
though, so
this situation can't happen since e is itself a prime
Apocalyptic: asciilifeform, somehow pgpdump refuses
to print info about
the invalid subkey, or at least I don't see
the keyid referenced
the way I see it for
the master key and
the signature packets
jurov: i stand corrected, it's not
this one
jurov: but if i'm ever getting into such uber-illegal
territory, i'm not advertising it here
jurov: 's got a "new" n900... after just a few hours it's clear why nokia had
to be gutted
Apocalyptic: and as such
there is no private
to even begin with
Apocalyptic: I guess maybe e isn't even prime with phi(N) on
those
ascii_field: and
the purpose was
to force
the victims
to revert
to plaintext
ascii_field: for all we know,
this is a straight 'dos' and no one actually knew
the privates
to
these
Apocalyptic: well given what i've
tried on
that HPA's i would not fully concur here
ascii_field: the authors of
the fakes also relied on
the 'plausible deniability' of using random crud rather
than proper mods
ascii_field: Apocalyptic: as a general rule, an rsa modulus generated without regard
to rules (primality
testing, pollard-rho,
the lot) is cheap
to factor.
Apocalyptic: ascii_field,
this may be more affordable
to fully factor
than HPA invalid's
fluffypony: yeah I know, but neither of us are
terribly au fait with it, so we'll just dip our
toe in;)
fluffypony: and
then we'll probably do
the Louvre because we haven't been in AGES
davout: ah you
took her with, nice!
fluffypony: I need
to
tweak
the presentation a bit, so
the wife will go
to
the spa for a couple of hours
davout: fluffypony: what are you keeping yourself busy with
tomorrow? visiting?
davout: fluffypony: neat! never been
there
jurov: GNU picked it up
then
jurov: someone has
to explain
this "subkeys" retardation << guess mr.zimmermann overengineered it and
then left
to rot
trinque: ah yeah I guess it's bad at concurrent writes;
that's fair
trinque: probably comes with comparisons
to key-value stores
that do barely anything aside retrieve by key
trinque: sure, I am saying I've personally never found sqlite3
to be slow
ascii_field: trinque: was going for 'simple' rather
than 'fast'
trinque: I wonder if anyone ever
tests
this hypothesis
Hasimir: I recognise most of
the names
mircea_popescu: tbh, someone has
to explain
this "subkeys" retardation
to me sometime. fucking pseudohierarchy devoid of meaning.
Hasimir: well,
that list 160 reads like regular posters
to
the enigmail mailing list
ascii_field: Hasimir: read carefully. we do not know where
they came from. but
the largest class we identified so far appears
to consist of carefully crafted spurious keys, made with a particular
transformation of original legit ones.
Hasimir: do
they all have subkeys or not?
Hasimir: and v2 keys == pgp 2.3
to pgp 2.6(i)
Hasimir: ok,
these weak ones you found, have you identified a common generation program?
Hasimir: but
then we should probably lose
them anyway
Hasimir: though you'll lose all
the v2 keys
Hasimir: yeah, you might want
to look at
the keybox (.kbx) format used in gpg 2.1, designed
to improve lookup speed with larger keyrings
Hasimir: though probably better
than
the sks solution
Hasimir: ascii_field, where's
the code you use
to run
these
tests anyway?
ascii_field: mircea_popescu: quite a few. which is consistent with
the 'random bits make
terrible rsa moduli'
thing.
mircea_popescu: ascii_field some
that had only broken moduli, in pairs.
ascii_field: i will be very surprised when a 'proper' pubkey
that some fella actually has on his own box, fails
the
test
mircea_popescu: Hasimir just put
the pubkey in
the box and it'll
tell you if it has or hasn't
mircea_popescu: Hasimir if it's been already processed you can see yourself
the result
Hasimir: alright
then,
take a crack at mine, same one as used with -otc and in my /ns info
ascii_field: and
the panic is entirely
the work of
the enemy, who is passing around
the idiot strawman
that 'rsa was broken. oh wait, no it wasn't! disregard
the whole
thing!'
mircea_popescu: Hasimir you have read
the paragraph at
the beginning yes ?
ascii_field: Hasimir: so far each of
the cases i have examined in detail had -at least one- legit rsa modulus in subkeys
assbot: Logged on 20-05-2015 11:53:36; *: mircea_popescu underscores
the ~probably~. it is not a certainly. not yet at least. moar uranium has
to be mined first.
Hasimir: which is why you need
to specify
the key ids, otherwise you're spreading unnecessary panic
ascii_field: Hasimir:
the shenanigans exposed appear
to have an intent which includes - but not necessarily limited
to - passing off spurious rsa keys for various names
mircea_popescu: two examples are given
there, each with
two moduli with 8-12 digit factos known
mircea_popescu: now, of
that list, at least some are
thoroughly broken
Hasimir: as all
the president@whitehouse.gov ones prove