264700+ entries in 1.79s
Vexual: can you get
a laptop with
a 232 anymore?
decimation: ascii maybe we can boot bios out of
a TPM
Vexual: plugging in
a printer in the old days with things turned on occasionally fried motherboards
Vexual: is there such thing as
a write once bios?
MisterE: gonna go so low and I;m
a buy them all
MisterE: plus Japanese lie about everything for
a long time before you get the real story
MisterE: I'm glad they failed like
a cancer fallen off
Namworld: Should have put
a 100 BTC short with x100 leverage as soon as bad news hit... if only there was
a place to do that.
kakobrekla: kraken: Hi Everyone - we are working on
a major re-design for the site (no, I don't know when it will come out).
Duffer1_: sure but with money trapped their already it's now
a question of what people believe they'll have an easier time withdrawing from gox
r3wt: ;;later tell Vexual i imported that private key. lets arrange
a time to chat
r3wt: i'm still
a nub and not familiar with all the commands
nubbins`: why not do
a ;;later tell vexual :)
nubbins`: you might as well have included
a photograph of yourself as
a young man
nubbins`: but they don't give
a fuck if you do or not
pankkake: so this is basically
a "are you alive" probe
nubbins`: just one more odd move in
a long string of them
ThickAsThieves: <nubbins`> i wonder are they going to keep the same setup for s.mg (run through
a coinbr account) or if they have/will have
a direct mpex account /// it already is
nubbins`: i wonder are they going to keep the same setup for s.mg (run through
a coinbr account) or if they have/will have
a direct mpex account
kakobrekla: >2.) The "missing div" period was
a result of very bad luck. Right now we don't have any way to prove this, but its what happened.
kakobrekla: >1.) Unfortunately, we don't have
a financial report yet. Putting one together is going to be
a very time consuming process, and we don't have the time quite yet. Soon though.
Bugpowder: looking for
a single big transfer to
a putative cold wallet
jborkl: so, it would seem there would have to be two different ways used or Mtgox was super duper special and got hit with
a unique attack that was used on no one else
jborkl: davout, the person scanned for all transactions that uses op_pushdata, from what I understand that should be very limited to
a certain problem being fixed- normally about 40
a day- it was 19 I think on Feb 7th and did not rise until the 10th
jborkl: One puzzle is that Mt.Gox announced their difficulties on Feb 7, and then explained Feb 10 that they were stopping withdrawals due to
a malleability attack. Since the OP_PUSHDATA2 attack didn't start until Feb 9, this attack can't be responsible for the Feb 7 problems. One possibility is there was
a different type of malleability attack that affected Mt.Gox. It would be interesting to get the hash
mike_c: the data has
a 2 minute resolution. the graph is obv. somewhat less, but it is taken from that data.
ThickAsThieves: namworld you lost me, i'll i'm saying is i bet if the right people spend the right amount of time looking at orders placed and filled, you'd see gox tzking everyone for
a ride
mike_c: the graph has
a 2 minute resolution
Namworld: At
a minimum, they manipulate price for
a profit.
jborkl: and I read the report about the txn problems, someone did
a blockchain analysis of the Push_whatever attack- the attack started 2 days after Gox got hit
mircea_popescu:
a guy who has been runing fractional reserve since ~2011, and who has lied on paperwork submitted
Bugpowder: If the hypothesis is that mtgox actively embezzled funds... Well that is
a possibility.
ThickAsThieves: i recall linking charts for at least
a week or two before
Bugpowder: It is
a known fact that many devs told them their method was vulnerable
Bugpowder: The test where you are like... Hey my accounting says I need to pay out 100,000BTC from the wallet and oh hey we have been manually resending 100,000BTC in transactions... And oh hey people have been telling us for months that our specific implementation is vulnerable to
a malleability attack... I wonder if something is funky
Bugpowder: them being incompetent at rolling out
a code fix and terrible at communication is.
Namworld: I still see people offering 40% at
a minimum.
TwinWinNerD: What do you guys think is
a fair pricing for GoxCoins right now?
kakobrekla: i dunno i just find the lappys funny on
a protest
Mallstromm: and now seriously: where is Vladimir? We need him to make
a "hitler discover his coins are stuck on Gox".
Mallstromm: but on
a custom linux distro is pretty safe.
mircea_popescu:
a) you don't need all ; b) nobody actually pulls disks anymore.
dignork: asciilifeform: pulled disk etc. This is
a directed attack. I can imagine this picture, patyvans travels all over us,chaina,w/e and pull disks from all tor users. Srsly?
Apocalyptic: "<m7a> actually, I think right now the entire mtgox issue is pretty relevant to bitcoin as
a whole"
dignork: mircea_popescu: ok, you suggest that mere fact of using tor, singles you. Since Snowden-induced paranoia this might not be
a case anymore.
mircea_popescu: who the fuck in his right mind would imagine that
a) tor actually serves your anonimity or b) in order to anonimize you create accounts is beyond me.
nubbins`: the omission of x vs y in the original statement threw me for
a loop
mircea_popescu: anyway, this isn't so much an exercise in showing how great bitbet is for this purpose, but moreover on how trivial it is to use any properly designed service as
a tumbler,
☟︎ nubbins`: okay, so the person sniffing traffic just watched me provide two addresses,
A' and B', to bitbet
dignork: but they can be flatten on
a series of bets, so ok, it can work
dignork: mircea_popescu: since bet is private, the bet itself is
a link between
A and B, the fact that bet was established over plaintext makes it not private in general.
mircea_popescu: nubbins` so now address
A dirty is connected to
A', clean
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform there is
a barb here. bitbet addresses are rather consecutive if you've noticed.
nubbins`: suppose he's in
a submarine in the middle of the atlantic
nubbins`: okay, well, let's not get hung up on "know". fact remains that
a direct connection has been made between
A and B
nubbins`: suppose person X's traffic is being sniffed. person X sets up
a private bitbet, with input address
A and payout address B. sniffer observes this. sniffer now knows that person X controls address B.
dignork: asciilifeform, sure, exit nodes are sniffing, or at least could, so it's
a working assumption
mircea_popescu: get in the wot, come back in
a year, i might care. probably i won't, but anywya.
Mallstromm: dignork: I've used bitcoinfog many times. It works just fine. They've been in business for more than
a year now. It's as safe as it gets. Just do not send hundreds of coins but
a few dozens at
a time
mircea_popescu: so you lost some money on
a bet, and some people won it.
Mallstromm: what it's sure is that sending the "tainted" coins from address
A to receive them back to address
A is just retarded.
dignork: if it's
a public bet, you're risking odds change
nubbins`: are you harping on people for having
a conversation?
Mallstromm: are you guys still discussing about the retarded "bitbet as
a tumbler" issue?
dignork: mircea_popescu: assuming it's
a private bet, placed over clear channel, it's trivially linked
mircea_popescu: take
a bet with
a:b odds. place bet
A on
a going to
A', bet B on b going to B'.
☟︎ dignork: mircea_popescu: I don't care if it's called tumbler, the idea is that person
A sends funds to person B in untraceable way. Placing bet over public channel is not so untraceable.
mircea_popescu: inasmuch as this is true, and you wish to do "x-tumbler-dance" obviously bitbet won't be
a good solution for oyu.