116300+ entries in 0.042s
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform t1 you publish K.sign(hash(S)) ; time t2 you publish J.sign(hash(S+S')) ; time t3 you publish S and S' thus proving J knew before everyone else.
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform i don't require that len(h(x)) < len(x).
mircea_popescu: hey, you're breaking rsa over there, do some useful stuff!
mircea_popescu: the one important salient point here is that what we would really like for a hash function would be a H so that it is mathematically proven that NO j' exists so that h(s+j) = h(s+j')
mircea_popescu: still, i wouldn't say these differences allow for a strict determination.
mircea_popescu: well yes, but in my secret-k scheme the epsilon is my domain alone.
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform because he decides when you find out rsa was broken
mircea_popescu: now this said, a provably collision-resistant h might be found ; and would be amply useful.
mircea_popescu: and the problem of t3-t1 being an interval at enemy's discretion rather than your discretion remains.
mircea_popescu: this is STILL a weaker standard than "gimme s in h(s)" albeit not quite as catastrophically bad as prevbiously thought
mircea_popescu: so he'll have to find proper salt-collision, h(s+j') = h(s+j)
mircea_popescu: so nobody cares about your S anymore because afatk, S' is S
mircea_popescu: and see the comments above re weaker standard and bad time exposure.
mircea_popescu: at time t1+e hitler publishes J' ; at time t2+e hitler publishes S'.
mircea_popescu: and t3-t1 is in his control, whereas epsilon is in mine
mircea_popescu: also enemy has t3-t1 to fish for the pair ; as opposed to epsilon
mircea_popescu: this is a much weaker standard of failure for h than "here's h(s) tell me s"
mircea_popescu: at t1.5 hitler deedbots J', at t2.5 hitler deedbots S' so that hash(s'+j') = hash(s+j)
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform your scheme is actually dead in the water because between t2 and t3 enemy can deedbot in your name.
mircea_popescu: because of the whole "array of keys" thing, it'd actually allow jumping over dead rsa
mircea_popescu: the correct pill to all of this being, of course, gossipd.
mircea_popescu: well yes, because it implements a sort of single-message kludge.
mircea_popescu: in general "collapsed cryptosystem" reduces one to a "either you have time-order and single-message or else you restart from scratch".
mircea_popescu: suppose for safety of this scheme, ? is made so that create-key takes a day.
mircea_popescu: this however is a necessary assumption (seen in t1 t2 etc) and not escapable in the current paradigm.
mircea_popescu: this system presumes there's such a thing as ordering of events.
mircea_popescu: J.sign("Here's the laydown : 1. rsa got fucked, this is the process to exrtract privkey from pubkey ; 2. message so-and-so on deedbot was creating by so-hashing this salt and this pubkey ; 3. this here key J was created by using cryptoisystem ? with rng = privkey.K, which guarantees i am the one that made it ; 4. please use this here J' in future")
mircea_popescu: i don't. the point is to prove K-J continuity , not to retain sole control of J
mircea_popescu: well no, i just publish the fingerprint. as per t2 = rsa broken, it then follows one can extract privkey.K from K
mircea_popescu: then at t2+epsilon when i publish k you extract privkey.K from it and check that J was made by create-key(privkey.K_
mircea_popescu: and if it further has a create-key() which seems more dubious, but is it allowable ?
mircea_popescu: so if ? has a encrypt() and decrypt() which seems like a safe proposition
mircea_popescu: because the only one who could make j is the one who at t1 owned privkey.L
mircea_popescu: i publish k, you a) verify it hash-salts to same value and b) encrypt to it
mircea_popescu: in this scheme, hash has to be epsilon-strong and that's all.
mircea_popescu: which is why yours and this are equivalent (they depend on the strength of has function)
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform but he has to also break the salted hash
mircea_popescu: at t2+epsilon, everyone can verify K-J continuity ; at t2 only breaker of rsa can verify.
mircea_popescu: t2+epsilon : i publish key J in cryptosystem ? which was created with entropy = privkey.K
mircea_popescu: t1 : i make rsa key K ; don't share it with anyone. i publish hash(salt+pubkey.K)
mircea_popescu: this doesn't matter so much, future cryptosystem will be made on the basis of rng ; rng can work with pubkey as entropy source.
☟︎ mircea_popescu: asciilifeform for one thing, unpublished key is a simpler variant. create secret key K, salt-and-hash K, publish K. at later point divulge K. verification is one step and passive for you.
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform maybe. somehow subjectively this is never perceived the same way.
mircea_popescu: depends. at 14 you prolly care about all the nude classmates you got there.
mircea_popescu: there are no absolutes here. better and worse are entirely undefined.
mircea_popescu: i dunno, pretend not to notice, see who tries to scam you ? eat their babies for desert ?
mircea_popescu: but yeah, mutual masturbation with phuctor not a bad idea, if it can be done somehow so it doesn't make the ensemble more friable.
mircea_popescu: trinque any hoap for wotpaste pubkey to deedbot directly ?
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform the whole thing was centered around "third and above degree effects, such as the social behaviour of "war""
mircea_popescu: can come in handy, if you're for instance repressing men-talking-about-women-and-society-their-own-way.
mircea_popescu: PeterL word. you can also induce them through masturbation ; and the process can result in a slight increase in amniotic fluid.
mircea_popescu: so you'd have expected them to ; romania was an ally after all ; and they did hit the oilfields.
mircea_popescu: however - the easy access petroleum, as well as copper, iron etc was hit first.