log☇︎
74100+ entries in 0.042s
asciilifeform: '"I am not happy with the dominance of Chinese contractors. In the first place, the money that they get from these contracts is externalised and all that they return here are meagre wages," said Edgar Syakachoma, himself a contractor. "Let the government also give us the contracts so that they benefit Zambians."' << hey, recall mircea_popescu's piece with the argentine anti-bus protesters
asciilifeform: ( classical btc 'thermodynamics', predispose to cartel. but 'kinetics' of ~randomsoup (vs 'intelligent' routing) make this less apparent. )
asciilifeform: !#s thermodynamics proposes kinetics disposes
asciilifeform: then again we may already be in the midst of just such a thing, there's, what, ~20k distinct nodes operating, and overwhelming majority of these, are simply rubbish
asciilifeform: and theoretically if the cartel births '9000' new sybils, it will force the use of something like my algo, whether anyone wants to or not, the layer of sibylade would become undrillable in its absence . but this is admittedly a stretch. ☟︎
asciilifeform: the fundamental problem is that the conditions favouring miner cartels are already baked into btc per se.
Mocky: but yes I see the knock on effects are not the same as superficial effects
asciilifeform: but end result may end up being a net where even moar 'winner take all' than presently.
Mocky: seems like no node operator benefits individually from a non-optimal link to miners.
asciilifeform: Mocky: the current algo optimizes for nuffin at all. but the puzzler is, if we were to optimize for ~something~, could it create a problem. esp if the algo worx as i predict, and the nodes using it, end up forming an optimally short link to the miners.
asciilifeform: Mocky: recall the chains of empty/near-empty blox the chinese sometimes emit
asciilifeform: Mocky: the boojum is that mining in classical btc worx in such a way as to amplify small advantages into gigantic
Mocky: asciilifeform, is there a way to quantify "for a time"? Because requiring a 'tour of duty' dun necessarily seem like a bad thing. Is showing up with faster hash rate and getting full advantage on day one something to optimize for? (or day N, which is why I wonder how to quantify)
a111: Logged on 2018-09-24 15:11 asciilifeform: diana_coman: traceroute --mtu destinationip will show the mtu of the 1st 'fraggable' node in the path
asciilifeform: but on the other hand, the current system makes for pestilential sibylism.
asciilifeform: and not merely because A,B,C reliably supply correct blox, but they also will have most reliable tx-eating. so they will get sent all new tx in preference to D.
asciilifeform: thereby any peer ranking algo that favours 'useful' peers, will give A,B,C a substantial advantage over any new D.
asciilifeform: gedankenexperiment : let's suppose that all new blox presently are born in nodes A, B, C. from there, propagate to rest of planet. the immediate peers of A, B, C, will have them parked at the very top of their peer table, right below the manually-added 'meat' peers. now say a D shows up. D may have faster hash rate even than A+B+C, but his blox will still be considered only ~after~ those of A,B,C. at least, for a time.
asciilifeform: or, rather, slightly increases the 'inertia'
asciilifeform: i'd be interested to see what mircea_popescu makes of this algo. because i can see a possible fatal downside.
mod6: I'm gonna think on it a bit.
mod6: Yeah, this might be a proper step forward to de-sibyling the thing. And as long as we can still service randos, even if in second place.
asciilifeform: ( nao, ideally all of the sane people would actually know one another and wot, and link their nodes via ciphered pipes, all the way to miner. but i dun expect to live to see this. )
asciilifeform: whatever machine cycles ~remain~ after this, can service randos.
asciilifeform: sanely-behaving nodes (both trb and hypothetical trb-compatible heathens, which exist, or we'd see 0 blox) ought to be able to find ~and keep~ each other company
asciilifeform: arguably 1st step to properly de-sibyl-ing the network.
asciilifeform: i suspect that it would lubricate both block rx and tx broadcast.
asciilifeform: imho a trb node ought to only advertise addrs that either a) part of the manual --addnode set the node was brought up with , or b) actually supplied a correct block in the recent past
a111: Logged on 2018-09-23 21:49 asciilifeform: in mostly unrelated lulz, there are apparently noads who shove a couple 100 MB (!) of bastard blox into a connected trb, prior to the latter throwing the ban switch ( because of the idjit shitoshi networking routine, actual disconnect happens a good 10-20sec after ban )
asciilifeform: this presently consists 90+% of boxen that get immediately (or rather, not quite immediately.. http://btcbase.org/log/2018-09-23#1853265 ) malleus'd ☝︎
asciilifeform: mod6: right nao, our address-getting mechanism is the ancient turdalicious one inherited from shitoshi -- where the table is blindly filled with whatever connected folx decide to throw in
a111: Logged on 2018-09-23 20:59 asciilifeform: http://btcbase.org/log/2018-09-23#1853137 << this reminds me of an item i had on chalkboard but never had a chance to actually bake -- a running log of where/when (ip, remote ver, time) noad got each incoming candidate block .
asciilifeform: mod6: my main hesitation re the item is that it may be 'plugging wrong end of funnel', quite possibly no such gymnastics would be necessary if we simply had a http://btcbase.org/log/2018-09-23#1853143 and always --addnode'd the actually useful nodes, rather than relying on pure chance ☝︎☟︎
asciilifeform: mod6: i was thinking of trinque's idea : suppose trb closed all open pipes if it finds that $configurable hours (e.g. 3) have passed without new blox
mod6: trinque: Thanks for reporting.
asciilifeform: diana_coman: traceroute --mtu destinationip will show the mtu of the 1st 'fraggable' node in the path ☟︎
asciilifeform: e receiver’s reassembly timer. For higher delay high capacity network paths, this limit of 65,535 packets in flight can be a potential performance bottleneck [RFC 4963].'
asciilifeform: in particular, 'Lost fragments represent a slightly more involved problem than lost packets. The receiver has a packet reassembly timer upon the receipt of the first fragment, and will continue to hold this reassembly state for the reassembly time. The reassembly timer is a factor in the maximal count of packets in flight, as the packet identifier cannot be recycled within the period defined by the sender-received path delay, plus th
asciilifeform: https://archive.is/ijjM3 << even moar pedantic detail re fraggism. ( can safely skip the ipv6-related crapola )
asciilifeform: ( this braindamaged design decision goes, as one might expect, back to the olden days when homo redditus was not yet on the net and 'arpa' designed for nukefest-related problems, not against 'ddos' ) ☟︎
asciilifeform: the other item of interest, not mentioned, is that quite a few infrastructural routers will simply drop frags, for the reason that all but 1 frag of a fragged packet contain no copy of the source or destination port -- and thereby impossible to ddos-filter. so they drop'em.
asciilifeform: ( can skip straight to section 'IP Fragmentation' )
asciilifeform: the 1 possibly noteworthy bit, is that fragging can take place anywhere in the route, while reassembly -- only at final receiver .
asciilifeform: diana_coman: https://archive.is/k6Wxb << udpism likbez ( may or may not contain anyffing new to you, but posting for the l0gz/n00bz )
asciilifeform: ave1: i was speaking generally, 'are there other hardwired pathisms in there'
a111: Logged on 2018-09-24 13:37 asciilifeform: ave1: pretty neat. curious, didja grep the whole thing for hardwired paths ?
ave1: asciilifeform, http://btcbase.org/log/2018-09-24#1853545, I had seen the path in the specs (gcc -dumspecs) so I knew I had to look in the gcc/config directory. Next was the i386 dir (used for everything intel > i386) next simple grep for "isystem" (I worried that the path would be constructed from parts and so would never be found). ☝︎
lobbesbot: BingoBoingo: Sent 35 minutes ago: <asciilifeform> crate seems to be in customs limbo still
BingoBoingo: <asciilifeform> !Q later tell BingoBoingo crate seems to be in customs limbo still << I don't expect the locals did anything at all Saturday/Sunday. No phone calls have been recieved yet. We still have more waiting time before panic time.
asciilifeform: diana_coman: try the local variant. but i expect even across 1 router hop you will see similar picture.
diana_coman: anyway, the above examples show also current logs on both sides - if anyone has feedback on it/wants to see something else logged, talk now
asciilifeform: ( pleasant surprises are few and far between in the internet-of-shit )
asciilifeform: so far is exactly what i expected to see, aha
diana_coman: that would certainly fit this observed mess, yes
asciilifeform: diana_coman: i.e. there's a tiny reassembly buffer, and if it is occupied while new frags fall in, it drops
asciilifeform: diana_coman: it's consistent with what i know of the braindamaged frag reassembly mechanism on most iron
diana_coman: anyways, this is just tiny pilot, not yet worth much analysis as such
diana_coman: basically one of each batch except one batch that was fully lost
diana_coman: asciilifeform, yes: http://p.bvulpes.com/pastes/1DmdC/?raw=true (IP edited out; you can easily match them by sizesent+timeSent
asciilifeform: the other simple experiment, re fragging, is to set up the receiver on local host, and then on same-lan box
asciilifeform: diana_coman: do you have a list of the ones that reached the other end ?
asciilifeform: diana_coman: tcpdump -i eth0 udp port YOURPORT -vv -X
diana_coman: yes, I'm trying to figure out mainly if I can at least make sure that it IS sent out of sender; then it can ofc get dropped anywhere on the route
asciilifeform: ( i long suspected that nothing far over 512, will reliably go ) ☟︎
diana_coman: well, technically speaking 6-65535; specifically: http://p.bvulpes.com/pastes/b2MqA/?raw=true
asciilifeform: diana_coman: the other thing, entirely possible that yours got fragged and never unfragged, this'll be path-dependent ( as discussed in orig thread )
asciilifeform: according to the man pg, sento() block unless one were to set MSG_DONTWAIT ( and we didn't )
asciilifeform: diana_coman: unless i misread the docs -- yes
diana_coman: hm, you mean it's guaranteed that the package is sent and out of the buffer before you can call send again ?
diana_coman: asciilifeform, yes, but if one sends a burst of 4 packets , they can overflow that buffer and get dropped, don't they?
asciilifeform: diana_coman: iirc max packet that linux will actually send, is 65507 byte
diana_coman: hm, a first tiny pilot test of the UDP send/receive looks quite dire (4 in 20 made it, when sent in batches of 4, random lengths); however, I don't know if it's not just overflowing the out buffer to start with (since default value in /proc/sys/net/core/wmem_default is 212992 so real would be half that iirc) ☟︎
lobbesbot: asciilifeform: The operation succeeded.
asciilifeform: !Q later tell BingoBoingo crate seems to be in customs limbo still
asciilifeform: ideally in the end there will be none.
asciilifeform: ave1: pretty neat. curious, didja grep the whole thing for hardwired paths ? ☟︎
deedbot: http://bimbo.club/?p=26 << Bimbo.Club - TMSR Log Summary - 9/17/2018
a111: Logged on 2018-09-24 05:00 trinque: genesis will be the frozen-in-time found item, and from there I'll be looking forward to patches to add ave1 gcc (and later ave1-reproducible-build-gcc), other improvements.
mircea_popescu: i wouldn't say that you're required/expected to actually go into some sort of "sponsor" relationship with a local fucktard.org. make-your-own sponsor, why not.
a111: Logged on 2018-09-24 04:19 Mocky: mircea_popescu, so local sponsor must hold >50% controlling interest in any new business. local chamber of commerce apparently on the look out for profitable opportunities with foreigners. I'm not sure where else to look specifically aside from generally making a lot of friends and getting introductions.
trinque: genesis will be the frozen-in-time found item, and from there I'll be looking forward to patches to add ave1 gcc (and later ave1-reproducible-build-gcc), other improvements. ☟︎
trinque: might even get an order of magnitude out of the vpatch with the purge.
trinque: what's left is to shave further weight out of the genesis (currently approx 12M, but this without purging unused versions of used ebuilds), and the accompanying post
asciilifeform looks forward to test
trinque: quick update on cuntoo before I depart. the fully machine-driven transformation from snapshotted gentoo to cuntoo genesis.vpatch works, and successfully rebuilt itself whole. I've also got the classical gentoo repo acting as a subordinate repository, such that porting ebuilds will be extremely easy (i.e. gentoo repo is now an overlay, just like musl overlay, which can be used or not as decreed by operator,
asciilifeform: was dead end, tho, at least in the way originally written
asciilifeform: trinque: the crapola-gluetrap steadystate in trb is what i was trying to kill with 'wires' experiment
asciilifeform: http://btcbase.org/log/2018-09-24#1853486 << twist : turns out linus has 'intersectional-feminist'(tm) daughter, who helped to break him ☝︎☟︎
a111: Logged on 2018-09-23 21:49 asciilifeform: in mostly unrelated lulz, there are apparently noads who shove a couple 100 MB (!) of bastard blox into a connected trb, prior to the latter throwing the ban switch ( because of the idjit shitoshi networking routine, actual disconnect happens a good 10-20sec after ban )
asciilifeform: this is an open problem. but there are some pretty simple things that still need doin', e.g. pill for http://btcbase.org/log/2018-09-23#1853265 ☝︎
asciilifeform: that we presently have no way to fully be rid of. is all.
asciilifeform: btw ( and this is not mega-revelation... ) 99.999..+% of noad traffic, is worse than useless -- box is speaking with noads who do not either bring it luscious next valid blox, NOR carry yer tx'en closer to miner, NOR even serve up full chain and enforce trad rulez thereon
asciilifeform: but i have not tested
asciilifeform: trinque: iirc ben_vulpes actually wrote an experimental this
trinque: thing really needs a "everyone I know is retarded, forget them and move on"
trinque: ah, well, the fuckwittism spread, because I've cron'd killall -SIGQUIT bitcoind now
asciilifeform: i've yet to see this 'stuck', aside from when actively verifying blox. if node with next block shows up, it goes.
asciilifeform: and otherwise happy to sit for 100 yrs talking to same fuckewits
trinque: what I don't have a model for yet is the perma-stuck state
asciilifeform: cuz it connects to diff nodes.