714900+ entries in 0.374s

Naphex: ;;rate 1 asciilifeform NSA Should make a open OTP
Token
gribble: Error: Spurious "]". You may want
to quote your arguments with double quotes in order
to prevent extra brackets from being evaluated as nested commands.
Naphex: ;;rate 1 asciilifeform NSA Should make a open OTP
Token ;]
Naphex: well - a completly open OTP
token, with hardware for sale would make a killin'
Naphex: i'd just stop
ther eand request gpg auth:P
Naphex: to just have it on
the phone / or cached or who knows what
Naphex: if i have
to deliver DH/GPG secret
to
the client for GAuth
Naphex: asciilifeform: still protecting Gauth secret ruins
the whole point
Naphex: you're not handling
the private keys since you can just check yubico servers
Naphex: for GAuth you gotta
transport
the secret
to
the user
Naphex: i'm not
trumpeting yubikey, but i don't know of a better OTP atm
Naphex: guess so, still.. you'd still need
the button pressed
Naphex: so yeah
they had
to
tape
the button
Naphex: (version 2.4) and found
that our attacks do not apply
to
this improved version.
Naphex: taken measures
to mitigate
the security issues. We examined an updated firmware
Naphex: Having discovered
the security problem, before publication, we contacted
the
mike_c: kakobrekla: perfect,
thanks.
benkay: i saw something
to
the effect in
the logs.
tbqf i don't in2 drama.
fluffypony: benkay: did you see
their reply
to my
TagPesa questions?
they're all shock and horror
that I suggested
that institutional investors and even casual observers aren't impressed with
them
Naphex: which you would need
to generate a valid otp
pankkake: unless it signs with
the main key
fluffypony: benkay: yeah
the whole
thing is a joke
pankkake: well, GPG allows you
to be partially online
benkay: fluffypony: you missed
the conversation where we mocked sfi for just listing a bunch of other people's projects on
their havelock page.
jurov: but
they must be somehow online for ppl
to be able
to
trade
jurov: thestringpuller: burnside (of btct)
trolled coinbr hard, because mpex keys are online
Naphex: don't place maxtrust(TM) on anything
though :)
jurov: manual process does have disavantages,
too
jurov: thestringpuller: mpex did lose few bitcoins due
to human errors, don't paint mp as saint
Naphex: but
the software is, and
there are some yubi software generators around
Naphex: and you don't have
to keep
the secret keys for it
Naphex: i'd recommend
the system over gauth
assbot: [HAVELOCK] [B.MINE] [PAID] 2.70729420 BTC
to 7`514 shares, 36030 satoshi per share
Naphex: asciilifeform: i
trust
them mostly, but
the security level is chosen by
the client. so if client
trusts yubi,
then it
trusts yubi validation servers
mike_c: mpex actually did lose some investor funds according
to rota :)
Naphex: just
to make sure
they are clean, and no 0 day can
travell
till
the end
Naphex: and
they check and validate
the protocol and messages before
Naphex: i have state-full firewalls
that know
the protocol before
Naphex: then server checks signature,
then checks otp
benkay: are you just eval'ing
those funcalls when you get 'em?
Naphex: OTP - is otp released
to
the client, by levels email yubikey/gpg/ - whatever
Naphex: signature is hmac-sha256 with secret, from field 1
to uuid
benkay: what does
the message look like?
Naphex: everything else gets dunked a long way from
there
thestringpuller: because you've audited all 100% of
the code oyu're running
thestringpuller: or
they can dump unencrypted memory with a 0 day exploit you have no idea about yet
trust your system completely
Naphex: the most sophisticated attacker, will need user secrets
to get whatever
they have
thestringpuller: please direct me
to another facility of such high standards.
Naphex: thestringpuller: honestly if you have a well designed system,
that gets breached and you get ninja'd out of
the 10 hotwallet BTC
pankkake: if
the machine is really offline even Windows ME should be fine!
Naphex: mean while, Joe Giner wants his 0.2 btc
that he just bought out now
Naphex: thestringpuller: well
thats
their priviledge
mike_c: hm, JD seems
to be down.
thestringpuller: mpex investors have
to wait sometimes up
to 24hours for withdrawals
danielpbarron: what's more secure; using a machine
that was set up before Bitcoin existed and hasn't been updated since; or a
totally fresh install?
Naphex: so you want
to sign
transactions offline?
thestringpuller: there is an implementation of hot wallets
that don't require
the key ring
to
touch
the internet
Naphex: even if an attackers gets
through mostly everything undetected
Naphex: now
the users have
that secret, so an intruder couldn't do much without user secrets
Naphex: if
the user's OTP is not valid
Naphex: won't accept any messages, whatever
the source or
trust
Naphex: thestringpuller:
there are hot wallets and cold ones
dexX7: ah np, just
trying
to understand your approach. at which point do you fetch and process incoming information?
thestringpuller: the firewall shouldn't
talk
to other machines with your "airgapped" software
Naphex: uh, what's
that related
to?
Naphex: but what i'm
thinking is just a notification system for BitcoinD clusters,
track
txid's, addresses and confirmations
Naphex: i will when
there is something working
dexX7: mind
to share a link?
Naphex: either
that or in reverse, where it connects
to a aggregate server, and
that just runs pubsub