log☇︎
714900+ entries in 0.374s
Naphex: ;;rate 1 asciilifeform NSA Should make a open OTP Token
gribble: Error: Spurious "]". You may want to quote your arguments with double quotes in order to prevent extra brackets from being evaluated as nested commands.
Naphex: ;;rate 1 asciilifeform NSA Should make a open OTP Token ;]
Naphex: well - a completly open OTP token, with hardware for sale would make a killin'
asciilifeform: take minute to think, what is yubi hiding, when refusing to publish the design ?
Naphex: i'd just stop ther eand request gpg auth:P
Naphex: to just have it on the phone / or cached or who knows what
Naphex: if i have to deliver DH/GPG secret to the client for GAuth
Naphex: asciilifeform: still protecting Gauth secret ruins the whole point
asciilifeform: you gotta transport the secret to the user << did i wake up today in a parallel universe where public-key crypto was never invented ?
Naphex: you're not handling the private keys since you can just check yubico servers
asciilifeform: that is decorated with alchemical symbols, in order to seem impenetrable to naive buyer
Naphex: for GAuth you gotta transport the secret to the user
asciilifeform: and undertakes to solve a problem to which there can be no solution
asciilifeform: the device comes with not one but two gestures of bad faith
asciilifeform: nothing to do with trojans
Naphex: i'm not trumpeting yubikey, but i don't know of a better OTP atm
Naphex: or taped
Naphex: guess so, still.. you'd still need the button pressed
Naphex: so yeah they had to tape the button
Naphex: (version 2.4) and found that our attacks do not apply to this improved version.
Naphex: taken measures to mitigate the security issues. We examined an updated firmware
Naphex: Having discovered the security problem, before publication, we contacted the
Naphex: asciilifeform: https://www.emsec.rub.de/media/crypto/veroeffentlichungen/2014/02/04/paper_yubikey_sca.pdf apperantly it got sca'd some time ago
mike_c: kakobrekla: perfect, thanks.
asciilifeform: a closed gadget suggests that there is something to be gained from learning what has been kept closed.
benkay: i saw something to the effect in the logs. tbqf i don't in2 drama.
kakobrekla: mike_c : http://bit4x.com/panacea/history/ < dis ok? note the csv url is different nao
fluffypony: benkay: did you see their reply to my TagPesa questions? they're all shock and horror that I suggested that institutional investors and even casual observers aren't impressed with them
Naphex: which you would need to generate a valid otp
pankkake: unless it signs with the main key
fluffypony: benkay: yeah the whole thing is a joke
pankkake: well, GPG allows you to be partially online
benkay: fluffypony: you missed the conversation where we mocked sfi for just listing a bunch of other people's projects on their havelock page.
jurov: but they must be somehow online for ppl to be able to trade
jurov: thestringpuller: burnside (of btct) trolled coinbr hard, because mpex keys are online
fluffypony: on the topic of SeedCoin: http://bitcoin-betting-guide.com/james-cannings-blog/seedcoin-fund-i-update-no-gocoin-what-next/
Naphex: don't place maxtrust(TM) on anything though :)
thestringpuller: true but far less than say bitcoinica
jurov: manual process does have disavantages, too
jurov: thestringpuller: mpex did lose few bitcoins due to human errors, don't paint mp as saint
asciilifeform: we cannot see if the promise is kept
thestringpuller: what's the point of 2 factor?
Naphex: but the software is, and there are some yubi software generators around
Naphex: doubt their open
Naphex: of the hardware?
asciilifeform: i see no description of the internals.
asciilifeform: Naphex: what can we tell from this marketing brochure?
Naphex: and you don't have to keep the secret keys for it
Naphex: i'd recommend the system over gauth
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Naphex: so there
Naphex: asciilifeform: i trust them mostly, but the security level is chosen by the client. so if client trusts yubi, then it trusts yubi validation servers
asciilifeform: gotta ask, what's the basis for trusting 'yubikey' ?
thestringpuller: mike_c: good point ;) man that was a long time ago
mike_c: mpex actually did lose some investor funds according to rota :)
Naphex: just to make sure they are clean, and no 0 day can travell till the end
Naphex: and they check and validate the protocol and messages before
Naphex: i have state-full firewalls that know the protocol before
Naphex: then server checks signature, then checks otp
benkay: are you just eval'ing those funcalls when you get 'em?
Naphex: OTP - is otp released to the client, by levels email yubikey/gpg/ - whatever
Naphex: signature is hmac-sha256 with secret, from field 1 to uuid
Naphex: forgot that :P
benkay: what does the message look like?
Naphex: everything else gets dunked a long way from there
thestringpuller: because you've audited all 100% of the code oyu're running
thestringpuller: or they can dump unencrypted memory with a 0 day exploit you have no idea about yet trust your system completely
Naphex: the most sophisticated attacker, will need user secrets to get whatever they have
Naphex: well put it like this
thestringpuller: please direct me to another facility of such high standards.
Naphex: thestringpuller: honestly if you have a well designed system, that gets breached and you get ninja'd out of the 10 hotwallet BTC
pankkake: if the machine is really offline even Windows ME should be fine!
Naphex: mean while, Joe Giner wants his 0.2 btc that he just bought out now
Naphex: thestringpuller: well thats their priviledge
mike_c: hm, JD seems to be down.
thestringpuller: mpex investors have to wait sometimes up to 24hours for withdrawals
danielpbarron: what's more secure; using a machine that was set up before Bitcoin existed and hasn't been updated since; or a totally fresh install?
Naphex: they want it too
Naphex: so you want to sign transactions offline?
thestringpuller: there is an implementation of hot wallets that don't require the key ring to touch the internet
Naphex: only the hot wallets
thestringpuller: that's all that matters
thestringpuller: so you keep the keyring hot?
Naphex: even if an attackers gets through mostly everything undetected
Naphex: now the users have that secret, so an intruder couldn't do much without user secrets
Naphex: if the user's OTP is not valid
Naphex: won't accept any messages, whatever the source or trust
Naphex: you trust the sig
thestringpuller: depends on the transaction volume
Naphex: thestringpuller: there are hot wallets and cold ones
dexX7: ah np, just trying to understand your approach. at which point do you fetch and process incoming information?
thestringpuller: the firewall shouldn't talk to other machines with your "airgapped" software
Naphex: uh, what's that related to?
thestringpuller: you can't trust the TCP/IP stack
thestringpuller: offline wallet can't touch net even on firewall part
Naphex: but what i'm thinking is just a notification system for BitcoinD clusters, track txid's, addresses and confirmations
Naphex: i will when there is something working
dexX7: mind to share a link?
Naphex: either that or in reverse, where it connects to a aggregate server, and that just runs pubsub