log☇︎
473800+ entries in 0.303s
cazalla: r u trying to shit post me back or wot m8
cazalla: what can i say other than he's right.. 9/10 aussies i met on 4chan love nothing more than shit posting
mircea_popescu: cazalla i find from 8chan that you suck. link related https://8ch.net/btc/res/33.html#212
assbot: Logged on 18-05-2015 02:45:11; decimation: Note that your headline was dinged for being inaccurate, while this guy's blog is more inaccurate by his own admission
mircea_popescu: http://log.bitcoin-assets.com/?date=18-05-2015#1135914 << i dun recall who put it in, mebbe davout but at any rate from what i've seen they couldn't get consensus behind the "inaccurate title" theory, or w/e it's called there. so that didn't werk. ☝︎
mircea_popescu: case exactly mirrored by freenode : about a year after they lost at least one server to what appeared like quite the nsa, and promising a full investigation, nothing's been released.
mircea_popescu: "More than two years after unknown hackers gained unfettered access over multiple computers used to maintain and distribute the Linux operating system kernel, officials still haven't released a promised autopsy about what happened."
assbot: Logged on 28-02-2015 02:20:09; trinque: flushing with fear on command is to my knowledge not possible
mircea_popescu: http://log.bitcoin-assets.com/?date=28-02-2015#1035818 << meet the slavegirls sometime. ☝︎
kakobrekla: click on the 0conf amount
cazalla: he answered it from memory but why necro that?
assbot: Logged on 28-02-2015 01:55:22; cazalla: so i made a bitbet under the influence and couldn't fund it until later, i assume 0 conf address listed for it in /propositions/ is the address of which i need to fund?
mircea_popescu: http://log.bitcoin-assets.com/?date=28-02-2015#1035777 << this is one for kakobrekla ☝︎
kakobrekla: since then nfi
kakobrekla: dunno it was sorta almost working until you started to fiddle with varnish
mircea_popescu: dja need me to reset pw or something there ?
mircea_popescu: oh that still dead ?
mircea_popescu: does it not do titles anymore ?
assbot: Logged on 18-05-2015 03:05:47; mircea_popescu: kakobrekla hey, is something the matter with assbot ?
mircea_popescu: mats http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/26/Girl_volunteers_of_the_People's_Self-Defense_Force_of_Kien_Dien%2C_a_hamlet_of_Ben_Cat_district_50_kilometers_north_of_Sai_-_NARA_-_541865.tif/lossy-page1-250px-Girl_volunteers_of_the_People's_Self-Defense_Force_of_Kien_Dien%2C_a_hamlet_of_Ben_Cat_district_50_kilometers_north_of_Sai_-_NARA_-_541865.tif.jpg << check out that grip.
mircea_popescu: pro tip : the north won.
LC^: mircea_popescu: thx for answering my questions so far. I have to jump on a call, but if I decide to go ahead with an article on this and have additional questions I'll look for you around here.
mircea_popescu: who the hell came up with the idea of putting these together even ;/
mircea_popescu: this however... this is something where raising awareness actually does something.
mircea_popescu: it's already underway. but, the more the merrier. this is the sort of thing where one can make a difference.
LC^: so do you expect your findings to inspire such a hunt?
mircea_popescu: not terribly costly, considering what "VC" firms spend and what they get for it.
mircea_popescu: adlai i would guess something between 50 and 100 BTC's worth of S.NSA engineer's time, and maybe a few months-box worth of hardware.
LC^: have you attempted to notify the owners yet and have you had any responses from them?
mircea_popescu: now THAT would be something if found.
mircea_popescu: we might consider publishing the "harmless" keys, but for one thing i am not altogether convinced they're so harmless, and for another, much more interesting would be a hunt for diddled php implementations.
mircea_popescu: in that particular circumstance, where an outside but present chance existed that the box was compromised itself.
mircea_popescu: the case of hpa was exceptional because at the time the lightning struck (and understand just how unlikely the event we had on our hands this morning was), a call had to be made.
mircea_popescu: there's been a total of three pairs, so six total keys to date. i have little doubt that as the program progresses through the list, more will be found. generally, the idea is to discuss this with the owners and them only.
adlai thinks a better question could be, "just quite how little human and computer labor did this experiment take?"
LC^: how many keys have you found so far? do you plan to disclose the owners of the other keys that are similar to hpa's? it doesn't seem to be a big risk there for the owners
mircea_popescu: there are also other types.
mircea_popescu: there are other people matching exactly hpa's profile (high value foss target) with keys apparently added in the same manner. not too many.
LC^: OK, what about the other keys? Are they similar to hpa's key? in the sense that they've been attached to other keys, but lack the proper signature?
mircea_popescu: because i did lots of the former and the latter never occured.
mircea_popescu: how often have you moved a file across the tubes ? how often did it have a magically changed byte ?
LC^: there are parts in some archive formats you can modify and the archive will still work, though year I understand your point, the suggested theory of damaged in transit would suggest random damaging not controlled modification
mircea_popescu: nobody keeps track of "mysterious" errors etc.
mircea_popescu: understand, opsec is extremely weak all over. including among supposedly experienced hackers. so, a simple scenario : guy with owned userland gpg sends secret info to hpa, it is magically encrypted to wrong key, email sniffed en route, secret is now known, but only to the people knowing what to look for. hpa responds with something like bad key, guy re-encrypts it and resends it.
mircea_popescu: especially amusingm, the "key was damaged in transit" one. people p2p HD movies all day, nobody's seen this. gpg data moves around as archives - try flipping a byte in an archive see if you can stil lget the content. etc.
LC^: particularly people looking to send him highly confidential info that would need to be encrypted
mircea_popescu: this, of course, is not the only mechanism that would allow such a key to exist. nevertheless, alternative explanations border on the risible.
mircea_popescu: clearly people looking at/for him would be the target, if anything.
mircea_popescu: in any case, the idea that hpa is the target of that attack - if indeed it is an attack - are at best naive and at worst disinfo.
mircea_popescu: but it is a theory - until someone produces such a diddled implementation it stays a theory.
LC^: I see, so the key would serve as an exploit of sorts or a trigger
mircea_popescu: this sort of thing (the so called "fail to pass" testing) is the exact sort of stuff we've seen from the nsa to date, and so it would mesh with that experience.
mircea_popescu: such as, encrypt to it, or email the NSA, or whatever else.
mircea_popescu: if however his pgp implementation is compromised in a specific way, the wrong key on the server may very well be the magic packet, causing it to behave in an unexpected - and not otherwise detectable - manner.
mircea_popescu: with a correctly working pgp implementation, the user connects ot a sks server, discards the wrong key and proceeds as expected.
mircea_popescu: suppose someone needs to talk to hpa - either to verify his signature or to send him encrypted communications.
LC^: I'm just trying to understand what the risk is here and why would someone create such keys, intentionally
mircea_popescu: one of the more interesting constructions as to the possible intended uses is, a tandem arrangement. it would work like so :
LC^: OK, what is the whole story?
mircea_popescu: this is factually correct. it is also not the whole story.
LC^: OK, but can they actually be used? some argued that the weak key supposedly belonging to hpa can't be used to decrypt emails or other data encrypting by him because it was not signed by his real key
mircea_popescu: i am plainly saying that while the weak keys incontrovertibly exist, it's unclear why they exist. someone put the effort into making them, which is not exactly trivial.
LC^: are you suggesting that some software was intentionally sabotaged to produce weak keys?
mircea_popescu: that aside, the question of how exactly weak keys came to be, and what are they doing there and so on and so forth is not nearly as uninteresting as the usg agency would like to make it.
mircea_popescu: there are all sorts of classes of broken keys, which we're obviously still sorting through.
LC^: I guess that is the main problem you're trying to highlight, correct? that some generators might be broken and generate weak keys
LC^: or are there indications that they've been generated by a broken generator
LC^: and whether the other keys that have been factored are similar
LC^: so wanted to get your opinion on the issues that have been raised, mainly that the first key was not signed by the owner so was likely added by someone else, with or without malicious intent.
BingoBoingo: LC^: You may also want to hang around for when Stan wakes up
LC^: I want to write an article about your Phuctor-related findings.
mircea_popescu: at the moment, you do not.
mircea_popescu: the right move would be to get in the wot, cultivate your presence here afterr which next time you may have an angle.
mircea_popescu: in other news, the next batch of usg dept of internet outsourcers, to replace the current batch of third worlders : http://i.imgur.com/9EG2jYA.gifv
asciilifeform: http://dpaste.com/167XKEJ#wrap << text
mircea_popescu: and in the daily 8cha lulz, https://8ch.net/btc/res/33.html#198
mircea_popescu: ah was trilema huh. brb
asciilifeform: mircea_popescu: it's a screenshot image, linked in a trilema article
mircea_popescu: worth a test.
mircea_popescu: hmm, anyone has a ready link to the discussion of the reddit deleting the blockchain thing because they had so much fucking consensus it ended up imploding under their feet ?
asciilifeform: worth considering - where are they likely to come into play (as fetched from sks)
asciilifeform: for anyone still awake, i'm presently wondering re: how the rotten keys behave in autoverifier scripts (debian ? etc)
asciilifeform: is the inescapable conclusion.
asciilifeform: they must employ the residents of a home for the profoundly retarded
mats: 'phunctor', thins instead of things, using 'Loper-OS' and 'Loper-os', shitloads of passive tense sentences...
mircea_popescu: aaaaand fort meade scoressssss again!111 on their ...
mircea_popescu: ‘Holy shit, they broke RSA!’ or ‘This is false advertising, they didn’t really do anything!’ imbeciles, << no but it's THE CONTROVERSY
mats: as though no editor was involved at all
mircea_popescu: again. team meade scores another hit on their imaginary, wildly irrelevant scoreboard.
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform not deliberate trolalge, deliberate damage control. can't google misspelled terms
mircea_popescu: team meade scores another hit on their imaginary, wildly irrelevant scoreboard. for which they get paid. with tax dollars. by idiots.
mircea_popescu: right, because poisoning hpa was the idea, not poisoning others.
mircea_popescu: asciilifeform notice that idiots are doing their pressing. "If I wanted to poison HPA with a fake key, why would I create a degenerate one? A fake key with strong factors would have gone unnoticed, at least by this analysis"
asciilifeform: anyone with an account (yes, they require one even for 'anonymous' comments) is welcome to post one.
asciilifeform: the mis-spellings are a deliberate trollage, or what.
asciilifeform: pete_dushenski: the animals in the photo at bottom of your latest article look like guinea pigs
BingoBoingo: Probably for the best
asciilifeform caught up with log, links, overwhelmed by sheer retardation of the pg wank circus, maxxed out dosimeter
asciilifeform: er opened the possibility that still other developers may have fallen prey to the attackers.'
asciilifeform: 'During that time, attackers were able to monitor the activities of anyone using the kernel.org servers known as Hera and Odin1, as well as personal computers belonging to senior Linux developer H. Peter Anvin. The self-injecting rootkit known as Phalanx had access to a wealth of sensitive data, possibly including private keys used to sign and decrypt e-mails and remotely log in to servers. A follow-up advisory a few weeks lat