160900+ entries in 0.047s
mircea_popescu: there's a sad dearth of research in this field. we don't even klnow which of pi*e and pi+e are transcendental. etc.
mircea_popescu: hopefully that relation holds in "well defined" alt-spaces.
mircea_popescu: except the only paired transcendentals i know of are pi and e.
mircea_popescu: which is why i'd like to see much more computationally intensive cipher and encryption.
mircea_popescu: if it costs enough to speak, these problems are solved by the very speech
mircea_popescu: this means he needs to talk to you before talking to you.
mircea_popescu: how does user find which are still good and which are spent, for instance.
mircea_popescu: give people a perfectly valid reason to only take crypto : "i don't want to be spammed"
mircea_popescu: make the postage stamp as part of the encryption, as it were.
mircea_popescu: if someone has to expend 1 petahash every time they send me encrypted anything, that's grand.
mircea_popescu: it only hinders the people who want to talk about it, is all.
mircea_popescu: contrary to piously fraudulent consensus in the field, expensiveness is a quality of cryptographic items.
mircea_popescu: the main advantage, perhaps counterin tuitively, to the PE? scheme is that it's so veryt computationally expensive.
mircea_popescu: maxint in there is quite literally, maxint. currently pi is computed up to about 2*10^13 or so digits. signed 64 bit max is ~10^19
mircea_popescu: the ? is obviously reserved for the name of whoever produces the damned º.
mircea_popescu: notably, this scheme does not necessarily produce the correct plaintext every time. CRC will probably have to be included in the message in any case ; massaging of convenient º/º' pairs will be required to get error rates statistically under an acceptable threshold.
mircea_popescu: the properties which º' must exhibit may make the entire scheme unfeasible, but i can't seem to prove º' may not exist.
mircea_popescu: the properties which º must obviously exhibit make it only partly similar to plain multiplication - perhaps group theory may produce a good candidate, i have not currently a very clear picture of what this item should actually be, but seems like some sort of modulo-multiplicator.
mircea_popescu: to decipher you calculate the maxint+key to maxint+key+block digits of e with a plouffe-like algo (not here included) which you º' with the ciphered message yielding the original plaintext.
mircea_popescu: you need a proper "destructive multiplication" item, which i'll discuss later, noted here º. you proceed to calculate the maxint+key to maxint+key+block digits of pi via repeated applications of the original plouffe algo, and you º the result with the plaintext message which yields the ciphered message.
mircea_popescu: So in re the tmsr call for papers. the Plouffe-Euler-? block cipher would work as follows :
mircea_popescu: also open to ammendations / fixes if anyone sees anything amiss.
mircea_popescu: from
https://cr.yp.to/bib/online.html : "instead of signing a copyright transfer agreement. If you ever encounter a publisher that doesn't accept this, let me know, and I'll be happy to blacklist that publisher here. I'm now blacklisting IEEE and ACM."
mircea_popescu: idealism is generally a stupidity-amplifier in all seen deployments.
mircea_popescu: so strange, seeing how what liberal means is "o, he's raping you ? good for you! spread wider ?"
mircea_popescu: what's liberal mean in the us anymore, retarded ? communist ?
mircea_popescu: it's not, no. what, you use a single key for all udp packets ever ?!
mircea_popescu: nobody is spending a dollar to break a safe that holds five cents.
mircea_popescu: you don't have to put the crypto layer UNDER the upd chunkage.
mircea_popescu: what else isn't proven, that teleco standards ALSO preclude good cryptography ?
mircea_popescu: looky : the insane 500 byte udp limit PRECLUDES good cryptography
mircea_popescu: ascii_butugychag the example then was that the chain allows you to introduce known-weak points in a subsequent pass without being able to know it
mircea_popescu: this is fucking stupid, as it just cements the bad but apparently tmsr-acceptable now cipher.
mircea_popescu: buncha retarded children told too often they're smart and special by drunks and whores.
mircea_popescu: note that this is how the "scaling bictoin" "discussion" among "experts" goes :
mircea_popescu: which isn't much of an idea, admittedly, but it's all i got.
mircea_popescu: after which i will write a cipher competition, and include my idea.
mircea_popescu: no matter how broken old shit is, it may be only used to bootstrap the creation of correct shit.
mircea_popescu: past a certain fixedness level, it can just fix itself.
mircea_popescu: i think it should yea. besides, here's the beauty of it : "broken" v as previously was could nevertheless be used to bootstrap fixed v as currently it is found. you know ?
mircea_popescu: fix MY fucking flat tyre so i go where I wanted to go in the first place., don't tell me idea is better than 2kbit bassomatic, i couldn't give less of a shit.
mircea_popescu: so sure, they "fixed" his error, but the wrong way. i don't want a fix for a flat tyre that consists in loading me up on a trai nthat goes a different direction.