# Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
# Distributed under the MIT/X11 software license, see the accompanying
# file license.txt or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.

DEFS=-DNOPCH

DEFS += $(addprefix -I,$(BOOST_INCLUDE_PATH) $(BDB_INCLUDE_PATH) $(OPENSSL_INCLUDE_PATH))
LIBS = $(addprefix -L,$(BOOST_LIB_PATH) $(BDB_LIB_PATH) $(OPENSSL_LIB_PATH))

LMODE = dynamic
LMODE2 = dynamic
ifdef STATIC
	LMODE = static
	ifeq (${STATIC}, all)
		LMODE2 = static
	endif
else
	TESTDEFS += -DBOOST_TEST_DYN_LINK
endif

# for boost 1.37, add -mt to the boost libraries
LIBS += \
 -Wl,-B$(LMODE) \
   -l boost_system$(BOOST_LIB_SUFFIX) \
   -l boost_filesystem$(BOOST_LIB_SUFFIX) \
   -l boost_program_options$(BOOST_LIB_SUFFIX) \
   -l boost_thread$(BOOST_LIB_SUFFIX) \
   -l db_cxx$(BDB_LIB_SUFFIX) \
   -l ssl \
   -l crypto \
   -static-libgcc

LIBS+= \
 -Wl,-B$(LMODE2) \
   -l pthread


# Hardening
# Make some classes of vulnerabilities unexploitable in case one is discovered.
#
    # This is a workaround for Ubuntu bug #691722, the default -fstack-protector causes
    # -fstack-protector-all to be ignored unless -fno-stack-protector is used first.
    # see: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/gcc-4.5/+bug/691722
    HARDENING=-fno-stack-protector

    # Stack Canaries
    # Put numbers at the beginning of each stack frame and check that they are the same.
    # If a stack buffer if overflowed, it writes over the canary number and then on return
    # when that number is checked, it won't be the same and the program will exit with
    # a "Stack smashing detected" error instead of being exploited.
    HARDENING+=-fstack-protector-all -Wstack-protector

    # Make some important things such as the global offset table read only as soon as
    # the dynamic linker is finished building it. This will prevent overwriting of addresses
    # which would later be jumped to.
    HARDENING+=-Wl,-z,relro -Wl,-z,now

    # Build position independent code to take advantage of Address Space Layout Randomization
    # offered by some kernels.
    # see doc/build-unix.txt for more information.
    ifdef PIE
        HARDENING+=-fPIE -pie
    endif

    # -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 does some checking for potentially exploitable code patterns in
    # the source such overflowing a statically defined buffer.
    HARDENING+=-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2
#


DEBUGFLAGS=-g
CXXFLAGS=-O2
xCXXFLAGS=-pthread -Wno-invalid-offsetof -Wformat $(DEBUGFLAGS) $(DEFS) $(HARDENING) $(CXXFLAGS)
HEADERS = \
    base58.h \
    bignum.h \
    checkpoints.h \
    crypter.h \
    db.h \
    headers.h \
    init.h \
    key.h \
    keystore.h \
    knobs.h \
    main.h \
    net.h \
    noui.h \
    protocol.h \
    bitcoinrpc.h \
    script.h \
    serialize.h \
    strlcpy.h \
    uint256.h \
    util.h \
    wallet.h

OBJS= \
    obj/checkpoints.o \
    obj/crypter.o \
    obj/db.o \
    obj/init.o \
    obj/keystore.o \
    obj/main.o \
    obj/net.o \
    obj/protocol.o \
    obj/bitcoinrpc.o \
    obj/script.o \
    obj/util.o \
    obj/wallet.o


all: bitcoind

# auto-generated dependencies:
-include obj/nogui/*.P
-include obj-test/*.P

obj/nogui/%.o: %.cpp
	$(CXX) -c $(xCXXFLAGS) -MMD -o $@ $<
	@cp $(@:%.o=%.d) $(@:%.o=%.P); \
	  sed -e 's/#.*//' -e 's/^[^:]*: *//' -e 's/ *\\$$//' \
	      -e '/^$$/ d' -e 's/$$/ :/' < $(@:%.o=%.d) >> $(@:%.o=%.P); \
	  rm -f $(@:%.o=%.d)

bitcoind: $(OBJS:obj/%=obj/nogui/%)
	$(CXX) $(xCXXFLAGS) -o $@ $^ $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)

obj-test/%.o: test/%.cpp
	$(CXX) -c $(TESTDEFS) $(xCXXFLAGS) -MMD -o $@ $<
	@cp $(@:%.o=%.d) $(@:%.o=%.P); \
	  sed -e 's/#.*//' -e 's/^[^:]*: *//' -e 's/ *\\$$//' \
	      -e '/^$$/ d' -e 's/$$/ :/' < $(@:%.o=%.d) >> $(@:%.o=%.P); \
	  rm -f $(@:%.o=%.d)

test_bitcoin: obj-test/test_bitcoin.o $(filter-out obj/nogui/init.o,$(OBJS:obj/%=obj/nogui/%))
	$(CXX) $(xCXXFLAGS) -o $@ $(LIBPATHS) $^ -Wl,-B$(LMODE) -lboost_unit_test_framework $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)

clean:
	-rm -f bitcoind test_bitcoin
	-rm -f obj/*.o
	-rm -f obj/nogui/*.o
	-rm -f obj-test/*.o
	-rm -f obj/*.P
	-rm -f obj/nogui/*.P
	-rm -f obj-test/*.P